J. v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

The parties submitted a joint discovery letter concerning three parts of the plaintiffs' deposition notice to the City under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). That rule requires an organization to designate a witness prepared to testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization.

The disputed topics concerned: (1) facts supporting probable cause for the arrests of the plaintiffs and potential class members; (2) efforts before or during the mass arrest to distinguish people who had engaged in unlawful conduct from those who had not; and (3) communications related to the decision or basis for making the mass arrest. The opinion states that the court's understanding was limited because the parties provided only the disputed portions of the deposition notice.

The City argued that the topics were premature because it had agreed not to oppose a future class-certification motion on the ground that individual probable-cause issues predominate. The court rejected that argument because probable cause was central to the merits, the court had not limited discovery to class-certification issues, and the plaintiffs might need to address probable cause in their class-certification motion. The City also argued that the topics improperly sought the personal knowledge of individual arresting officers.

Court's Analysis

For the probable-cause topic, the court rejected the view that an organization may testify only about its formal litigation positions. Rule 30(b)(6), the court explained, expressly covers information known or reasonably available to the organization. The court agreed, however, that requiring the City to prepare a witness about one specific person's knowledge would often duplicate that person's individual testimony, and that requiring testimony about a large group of people's knowledge could be unduly burdensome or disproportionate.

The court therefore limited the City's required testimony. The City must produce a witness prepared to testify about the mass arrest and, to the extent the City identifies relevant facts distinct from the probable-cause determination for the mass arrest, probable cause supporting the named plaintiffs' individual arrests. The witness need not prepare to testify about facts specific to absent potential class members as they relate to individualized probable-cause assessments, unless the City intends to rely on that conduct to support probable cause to detain the group as a whole. The order states that it is without prejudice to the plaintiffs seeking other relevant discovery about other individuals' arrests or seeking further testimony about specific potential class members upon a showing of need.

For the topic concerning efforts to distinguish people who had engaged in unlawful conduct from those who had not, the City must provide a witness about those efforts, or the feasibility of making those distinctions, when they factored into the decision to make the mass arrest or into instructions for carrying it out. The witness is not expected to know or testify about every such action taken by individual officers at the scene.

For the communications topic, the court found it unreasonable to require a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to testify about the circumstances, meaning, or intent of every specific communication. The plaintiffs could generally depose the employees who made those communications. The City must nevertheless provide a witness prepared to testify about general issues, including the communication methods used during the event, the identities of key participants when that attribution is not obvious, and whether the City's retained and produced communication records are authentic and complete. The court encouraged the parties to meet and confer about the expected scope of this testimony.

Disposition

The order resolved the discovery letter by requiring the City to provide testimony within the stated limits. It did not decide whether the arrests were supported by probable cause, whether any plaintiff's claims would succeed, or whether a class should be certified. Judge Lisa J. Cisneros entered the order on April 9, 2025.