Steinberg v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.

Background

Ahouva Steinberg alleged that Cushman & Wakefield PLC, Cushman & Wakefield Global, Inc., Cushman & Wakefield U.S., Inc., Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC, Cappelli Development LLC, Cappelli Organization LLC, and RFMCH Huguenot Property Owner, LLC discriminated against her during her employment. She asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law based on her sex, sexual orientation, and Jewish ethnicity. She alleged disparate treatment and a hostile work environment.

Steinberg worked as the property manager of 3Thirty3 from February through August 2022. She alleged that the Cappelli entities owned or controlled the property and hired the Cushman & Wakefield entities to manage it. According to the complaint, the entities shared or exercised control over matters including hiring, firing, pay, supervision, payroll, and daily work activities. Steinberg also alleged that her employment letter came from “Cushman & Wakefield,” her employment records listed Pinnacle and the Cushman & Wakefield entities as employers, her work email used Cushman & Wakefield addresses, and her pay deposits came from a Cushman & Wakefield account.

Motion and legal standard

The Cushman & Wakefield defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They argued that Steinberg had not plausibly alleged that they were her employers. Steinberg opposed the motion.

The report explains that an employment relationship is required for her Title VII claims and is relevant to her claims under Section 1981 and the New York State Human Rights Law. It also explains that an entity may be liable even if it was not the worker’s formal direct employer under either a single-employer theory or a joint-employer theory. A single-employer relationship may exist when nominally separate entities operate as one integrated enterprise. A joint-employer relationship may exist when multiple employers significantly control the same employees or share responsibility for important employment terms.

At the pleading stage, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly support relief. The report states that single-employer and joint-employer status generally involve factual questions not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

Analysis

Judge Cave concluded that Steinberg alleged enough facts to support discovery into whether the Cushman & Wakefield entities, Pinnacle, and the Cappelli entities functioned as a single employer. The allegations concerning common addresses, corporate relationships, the employment offer, payments, employment records, email addresses, and human-resources contacts supported a sufficient alleged relationship among the Cushman & Wakefield entities and Pinnacle.

The report also found sufficient allegations concerning the relationship between the Cushman & Wakefield and Cappelli entities. Steinberg alleged that the Cappelli entities funded and monitored the payroll account, exercised unusual control over the property-management team, and gave specific instructions concerning work at the property. She further alleged that Cappelli representatives participated in hiring decisions and had the final say over hiring and firing decisions involving Cushman & Wakefield employees at 3Thirty3.

Judge Cave determined that these allegations plausibly supported centralized control over labor relations and showed that the entities could both make final employment decisions concerning Steinberg. The report separately concluded that the allegations put the Cushman & Wakefield defendants on notice of Steinberg’s joint-employer theory because they described shared control over hiring, firing, and compensation.

The report did not decide whether Steinberg ultimately proved discrimination, whether the defendants were in fact her employers, or whether the defendants would be liable. It decided only that the complaint adequately alleged the employer relationship required to continue past the motion-to-dismiss stage. The report stated that it did not need to address Steinberg’s request to amend because it recommended denying the motion, but it would recommend allowing amendment if the motion were ultimately granted in whole or in part.

Recommended disposition

Judge Cave respectfully recommended that the motion to dismiss filed by the Cushman & Wakefield defendants be denied. She also recommended that Cushman & Wakefield National Corporation be dismissed as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), based on Steinberg’s agreement to dismiss that entity. The report and recommendation stated that the parties had fourteen days after service to file objections, and that Judge Dale E. Ho would address any requests for extensions and the objections process.