Barra v. Edward Jones SBL, LLC

Background

Paula Barra sued Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., doing business as Edward Jones, and Marie Green. She asserted two claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA): interference with protected leave rights and retaliation. She also asserted a disability-discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) based on her association with her daughter.

Barra alleged that she left work in November 2022 after learning that her daughter was suicidal and needed emergency psychiatric care. She later informed her employer that she would take FMLA leave beginning December 7, 2022, to care for her daughter. Barra alleged that she tried to obtain the required medical certification from her daughter’s therapist and the hospital where her daughter had been treated, but both initially declined to provide it. The therapist eventually sent the certification to the defendants on January 13, 2023. Barra returned to work on January 3, 2023, and alleged that Green told her she had been terminated.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the Second Amended Complaint did not allege enough facts to state plausible claims. At this stage, the court treated well-supported factual allegations as true and viewed reasonable inferences in Barra’s favor, while not accepting bare legal conclusions as facts.

FMLA Retaliation Claim

The defendants argued that Barra had not taken FMLA-protected leave because she failed to provide certification on time. The court explained that certification generally must be provided within the employer’s requested period, unless that is impracticable despite the employee’s diligent, good-faith efforts. The court found that Barra plausibly alleged such efforts: she sought certification from two providers, both initially declined for reasons connected to their evaluation or treatment of her daughter, and the therapist later provided the paperwork. The court therefore found that Barra sufficiently alleged that she took FMLA leave and denied the motion as to the First Cause of Action.

FMLA Interference Claim

The defendants argued that Barra could not claim interference because she received four weeks of leave and did not identify a specific additional leave request that was rejected. The court found that Barra’s statement that she might need more FMLA leave in the future, depending on her daughter’s needs, was sufficient notice under controlling Second Circuit precedent. The court emphasized that she gave this notice while already on FMLA leave. It therefore denied the motion as to the Second Cause of Action.

NYSHRL Associational Disability Discrimination Claim

The defendants argued that the NYSHRL does not provide a cause of action for associational disability discrimination. The court rejected that argument. It reasoned that the NYSHRL should be interpreted broadly to advance its antidiscrimination purpose, tracks the New York City Human Rights Law, and that the New York City law provides protections at least as broad as the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, which recognizes associational discrimination. The court also noted that other New York state and federal courts had recognized such claims under the NYSHRL. It therefore denied the motion as to the Third Cause of Action.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety, specifically denying it as to Barra’s First, Second, and Third Causes of Action. The defendants were ordered to answer the Second Amended Complaint by May 5, 2025. The parties were ordered to confer and file a case-management plan and scheduling order by May 27, 2025. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 40.