Paleveda v. Alameda County

Background

Nicholas Ewing Paleveda, a detainee proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Alameda County and other defendants. The court had dismissed his original complaint with permission to amend. Paleveda then filed an amended complaint.

The court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires preliminary review of a prisoner’s claims against governmental entities or their officers and employees. The court must identify claims that may proceed and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant. It also explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires enough factual information to give defendants fair notice of the claims and make relief plausible.

Claims the Court Found Cognizable

Paleveda alleged that Buenrostro denied his request for a kosher diet and that Chavez, Young, and an unidentified defendant improperly denied his grievances. The court found a cognizable claim against Buenrostro concerning the denial of the kosher diet. It found no claim against the defendants who allegedly denied the grievances because there is no constitutional right to a prison grievance or administrative appeal system.

Paleveda also alleged that Byrd, Seig, and Gaoteote searched his cell and removed sacred hair trimmings connected to a Biblical vow. The court held that the removal of the hair trimmings stated a religious-rights claim. It also found that Paleveda stated a retaliation claim against Gaoteote based on the allegation that Gaoteote issued a disciplinary report in retaliation for Paleveda seeking return of the hair and requesting a hearing.

Claims the Court Found Insufficient

The court found insufficient Paleveda’s allegation that Posedel, Chavez, and Young refused to pray with him. The court stated that Paleveda might be able to allege a claim about denial of religious services or a chaplain, but he did not provide enough detail or identify which defendant denied the request and how the denial violated his rights.

The court found no due-process claim based on the removal of the hair trimmings and denial of an administrative hearing. It explained that a random and unauthorized loss of property generally does not support a § 1983 due-process claim when an adequate state remedy is available, and it stated that California provides such a remedy.

Paleveda also alleged that Posedel found him guilty at a disciplinary hearing and that Keles imposed 30 days’ loss of privileges. The court found the due-process allegations inadequate because Paleveda did not explain how his rights were violated at the hearing or how the loss of privileges constituted a due-process violation.

The court further found that the exercise-related allegations did not identify an involved defendant or sufficiently explain the constitutional violation. It also identified allegations about dirty cells, information concerning the jail’s attorney, other retaliation, and other matters as unrelated claims involving numerous defendants. The court directed Paleveda either to remove those claims and defendants from the next complaint or bring them in a separate action, warning that failure to do so could result in dismissal of those claims and defendants.

Disposition

The court dismissed the amended complaint with leave to amend and allowed Paleveda to file a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint had to be filed within 28 days of the order, use the required case caption and case number, and state “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT” on its first page. The court explained that an amended complaint replaces the earlier complaint, so Paleveda had to include every claim he wished to pursue and could not incorporate the original complaint by reference.

The court denied Paleveda’s motion for judgment, docket number 21, and his motion concerning section 1985 status, docket number 22. It also stated that failure to amend on time could result in dismissal of the claims and defendants identified in the order, and that failure to prosecute or keep the court informed of an address change could result in dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).