Banks v. San Mateo County District Attorney's Office

Background

Carrie Banks alleged that Fernando Altuna Mendoza entered her home while she was unconscious and raped her in July 2021. He was later charged with multiple felonies in state court. Banks alleged that, shortly before trial, prosecutor Sharron Lee offered him a plea deal allowing him to plead guilty to false imprisonment rather than the originally charged sex offenses. Banks alleged that Lee did not consult her before presenting the deal, and that other prosecutors and victim-services personnel did not properly address her complaints. She also alleged that probation officials failed to consult her before making a recommendation concerning a later probation violation.

Banks sued San Mateo County, the San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office, the San Mateo County Probation Department, and individual defendants. Her federal claims alleged equal-protection and due-process violations, supervisory liability, and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute for violations committed under state authority. She also asserted five California-law claims and sought damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.

Ruling on Individual Defendants

The court held that the prosecutors and the district attorney’s office victim-services personnel were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. That immunity applies to conduct closely connected to a criminal prosecution, including plea bargaining, presenting a plea deal, evaluating evidence, interviewing witnesses, and related advocacy. The court held that the alleged conduct by the probation officers was likewise advocacy connected to the criminal proceeding and therefore protected by absolute immunity.

The court dismissed the federal claims against the individual defendants with prejudice. Because the court found absolute immunity, it did not reach the question of qualified immunity.

Ruling on Municipal Defendants

The court held that the District Attorney’s Office and Probation Department were improper defendants for the § 1983 claims and dismissed those federal claims with prejudice. It also dismissed with prejudice Banks’s first through third federal claims against San Mateo County because those claims relied on supervisory liability, and a county cannot be held liable under § 1983 simply for the acts of its employees through respondeat superior, meaning automatic employer liability.

The court separately considered Banks’s fourth claim against the County, alleging municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court found that the complaint’s allegations concerning a county custom or practice, failure to train, and ratification were not sufficiently clear or detailed. It granted Banks one chance to amend that claim against the County of San Mateo. The court stated that an amended complaint would need nonconclusory facts and that mere failure to discipline or acquiescence generally would not establish ratification. It also noted that a single constitutional violation ordinarily does not establish a longstanding county policy or custom. The court assumed, without deciding, that Banks had alleged an underlying constitutional violation.

Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

The court held that Banks lacked standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief because the alleged possibility that she would again be harmed, prosecuted through a similar plea process, and denied consultation depended on too many speculative events. The court dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend.

Disposition

The motion to dismiss was granted, with leave to amend in part. Banks’s amended complaint was due by May 9, 2025 and could pursue only the Monell claim against San Mateo County. The court stated that if Banks did not amend, it would decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining California-law claims and dismiss those claims without prejudice.