Warren Peary v. DC Comics, Inc.

Background

Mark Warren Peary sued DC Comics, Inc., DC Comics, DC Entertainment, Inc., and Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. Peary brought the action individually and as executor of the Estate of Joseph Shuster. Shuster was a co-creator of Superman. Peary alleged that copyright interests in Superman had reverted to Shuster’s estate in Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Australia, and that the defendants continued exploiting Superman in those countries without the estate’s authorization.

Peary sought a declaratory judgment, damages, and injunctive relief. He also moved for a preliminary injunction. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, to transfer the case to another federal district.

Diversity Jurisdiction

The court held that diversity jurisdiction was unavailable because complete diversity of citizenship was missing. Although Peary alleged that he was a New Mexico citizen individually, the diversity statute treats a legal representative of a decedent’s estate as a citizen of the same state as the decedent. Shuster was a California citizen when he died, so Peary was treated as a California citizen in his capacity as executor.

DC Comics is a general partnership, whose citizenship includes the citizenship of each partner. One of its partners, E.C. Publications, Inc., was a California citizen because its principal place of business was in California. Therefore, California citizens appeared on both sides of the case, defeating complete diversity.

Federal-Question Jurisdiction

The court also rejected federal-question jurisdiction. Peary’s infringement claims were expressly based on the copyright laws of Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Australia, rather than United States law. The Declaratory Judgment Act did not independently provide federal jurisdiction or create a cause of action.

The court further held that the Berne Convention did not provide a basis for jurisdiction because it is not self-executing—that is, it does not itself create a private right to sue in federal court. The court noted that Peary did not rely on those two grounds for federal-question jurisdiction in his opposition to dismissal.

Peary instead relied on the substantial-federal-question doctrine, which can allow federal jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim when it necessarily raises a disputed and important federal issue that can be resolved in federal court without disrupting the division of responsibility between federal and state courts. The court held that Peary’s asserted issues concerning United States copyright law and the Berne Convention were fact-specific and important mainly to the parties’ dispute, rather than important to the federal legal system as a whole. The court also found that some asserted issues were not necessarily raised or actually disputed, and that issues related to a possible defense could not create federal-question jurisdiction.

Disposition

The court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. It did not address the defendants’ alternative request to transfer the case. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it denied Peary’s preliminary-injunction motion as moot. It also denied the defendants’ motion to strike Peary’s declaration as moot. The Clerk was directed to terminate the listed motions and close the case.