Cavanaugh v. Individuals

Background

Douglas Cavanaugh alleged that the defendants infringed his copyrighted artwork by selling jewelry pendants through online storefronts without authorization. On March 31, 2025, the court entered a temporary restraining order based on Cavanaugh’s showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, a threat of irreparable harm, and the need to preserve the status quo. The order barred further allegedly infringing conduct and authorized expedited discovery to identify the defendants and their contact information.

Cavanaugh moved for permission to serve the defendants electronically under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Rule 4(f)(3). He argued that conventional service was impracticable because there were many defendants, their addresses were located in different states and countries, the defendants were interconnected, and physical addresses associated with online businesses might be unreliable.

Court’s Analysis

The court considered defendants located in the United States, countries that are parties to the Hague Convention on service abroad, and countries that are not parties to that convention. It stated that email service could be authorized when traditional service was impracticable, when it was not prohibited by an international agreement, and when it was reasonably calculated to give the defendants actual notice.

For countries that had objected to service through postal channels under Article 10 of the Hague Convention, the court applied the convention’s urgency exception for provisional or protective measures. The court found that exception satisfied because Cavanaugh had shown a substantial risk of irreparable harm from delay, the court had already issued a temporary restraining order based on ongoing infringement, and service through the central authorities of China and Turkey could take 12 to 18 months or be procedurally unreliable.

The court also found that the proposed email addresses were associated with the defendants’ online storefronts and were necessary for operating those storefronts and communicating with customers. It therefore concluded that email service was reasonably calculated to inform the defendants about the case and give them an opportunity to respond.

Ruling

Judge Jennifer H. Rearden granted in part Cavanaugh’s motion for alternative service. The court authorized service of the summons, complaint, temporary restraining order, and other initiating documents on each defendant by email at addresses identified by the relevant online service providers in response to Cavanaugh’s discovery requests.

The court ordered that service would be effective when the emails were transmitted, with no further service required to notify the defendants except as required for compliance with the Hague Convention or as otherwise ordered. The order separately states that, for purposes of obtaining a default judgment, email service alone would not satisfy the obligation to serve the summons and complaint on defendants in countries that had objected to service under Article 10. The order says the motion was granted in part but does not specify in the excerpt what portion, if any, was not granted.