Charugundla v. Lasala

Background

Kent Charugundla and Marguerite Charugundla filed the action in New York Supreme Court on January 28, 2025. Defendant Michael B. First later filed a notice of removal seeking to move the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The notice included the summons and complaint but did not include other state-court filings, including affidavits of service and filings connected to the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment.

The notice also did not include written consent from the other defendants. After the court ordered First to explain why the case should not be returned to state court for failure to satisfy the rule of unanimity—the requirement that all properly joined and served defendants join in or consent to removal—First submitted a stipulation signed by the defendants’ attorneys. The defendants themselves did not sign the stipulation.

Plaintiffs’ arguments

The plaintiffs argued that the removal was procedurally defective for two reasons. First, they contended that the notice of removal did not include all required state-court process, pleadings, and orders. Second, they argued that the other defendants had not independently and unambiguously consented to removal because the stipulation was signed by counsel rather than by the defendants.

Court’s analysis

The court denied the motion to remand. On the rule of unanimity, it held that all defendants had consented to removal through the stipulation at Dkt. 4-1. The court stated that the fact that the stipulation was signed by defense counsel rather than by the defendants themselves was immaterial. The court relied on authority recognizing a written indication by a person or entity formally acting for a defendant, with authority to do so, as sufficient evidence of consent.

The court also rejected the argument based on missing state-court papers. It stated that it was not clear that the removal statute required the notice to include the affidavits of service or the plaintiffs’ withdrawn motion for default judgment. Even assuming that defendants had omitted required papers, the court explained that such an omission was a procedural defect that could be cured in federal court, rather than a jurisdictional defect requiring remand.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at ECF No. 8. The opinion did not decide the merits of the parties’ underlying claims; it decided only whether the alleged removal defects required returning the case to state court.