Pomales v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Millie Cabrera Pomales applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. After the applications were denied, she sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In an earlier decision, the court granted Pomales’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings under sentence four of Section 405(g).

The earlier decision found that the administrative law judge, or ALJ, did not adequately develop the record concerning Pomales’s mental-health treatment. At the relevant time, Pomales was representing herself. The ALJ had not obtained all of her mental-health treatment records or any treating-source opinions before deciding her claim. The court found that this missing information created an obvious gap in the record and affected the ALJ’s assessment of Pomales’s residual functional capacity, meaning her ability to perform work-related activities.

Motion to Alter or Amend

The Commissioner moved under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the earlier judgment. The Commissioner did not challenge the remand itself. Instead, the Commissioner objected to reading the earlier decision as requiring the agency to obtain a treating-source opinion about Pomales’s mental impairments, arguing that this requirement was inconsistent with the Social Security regulations revised in 2017.

Rule 59(e) permits changing a judgment only when the moving party identifies an intervening change in controlling law, newly available evidence, a clear legal error, or a need to prevent serious injustice. The court found that the Commissioner identified neither a change in controlling law nor new evidence, so it considered whether the earlier decision contained a clear error or would cause serious injustice.

Court’s Analysis

The court recognized that the 2017 regulatory revisions ended the former treating-physician rule. But it concluded that the ALJ’s separate duty to develop a complete record—including contacting treating providers when necessary to provide a full and fair hearing—continues to apply under the newer regulations.

The court also reaffirmed that a remand is not automatically required whenever a treating physician’s opinion is missing. A remand may be unnecessary when the administrative record has no obvious gaps and contains enough evidence for the ALJ to assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity. In Pomales’s case, however, the court found that the ALJ lacked a complete mental-health treatment history and had not found any existing opinion evidence persuasive. Given those circumstances, the court determined that obtaining the missing treatment records and a treating-source opinion was necessary for a proper disability determination.

Disposition

The court held that its earlier decision contained no clear legal error and did not create a serious injustice. It therefore denied the Commissioner’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). The earlier remand for further administrative proceedings remains in effect.