Pharo Gaia Fund, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
- Analisa Torres
- 1:20-cv-08497
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 6
In Pharo Gaia Fund v. Venezuela, Judge Torres vacated plaintiffs’ default judgment and dismissed their claims without prejudice because sanctions made the judgment impractical.
Pharo Gaia Fund, Ltd., Pharo Macro Fund, Ltd., and Pharo Trading Fund, Ltd., and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The plaintiffs lost the existing default judgment but may bring the claims again, while Venezuela was relieved of the judgment requiring it to pay more than $1.396 billion.
What happened
In Pharo Gaia Fund, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, three funds had obtained a default judgment requiring Venezuela to pay more than $1.396 billion for unpaid sovereign bonds. They later asked the court to cancel that judgment and dismiss their claims without prejudice.
The court found that Venezuela’s failure to pay and continuing U.S. sanctions made the judgment practically worthless, while also making it harder for the plaintiffs to transfer or trade the bonds. The court concluded that these unusual circumstances caused the plaintiffs an extreme and unfair hardship and that canceling the judgment would not harm Venezuela.
Judge Torres granted the motion, vacated the default judgment, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice. The dismissal allows the claims to be brought again, although the court said refiling appeared unlikely.
The detailed version
- Pharo Gaia Fund, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela · No. 1:20-cv-08497
- Analisa Torres
- May 1, 2025
Background
Pharo Gaia Fund, Ltd., Pharo Macro Fund, Ltd., and Pharo Trading Fund, Ltd. sued the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for failing to make required payments on eight series of sovereign bonds. Venezuela did not appear after being served through diplomatic channels, so the court entered a default judgment in October 2021. The judgment awarded the plaintiffs $1,396,434,079.98 in unpaid principal and accrued contractual interest, plus post-judgment interest and attorneys’ fees.
The plaintiffs spent years trying to enforce the judgment against Venezuela and its state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). U.S. sanctions generally prevented enforcement against property belonging to Venezuela or PDVSA. The plaintiffs obtained attachments of shares in PDVSA’s holding company in Delaware and participated in a related sale process, but the court noted that creditors with earlier judgments held approximately $18 billion and that recent bids were far lower.
The plaintiffs also told the court that the judgment made the underlying bonds harder to transfer or trade. Because part of the bond debt had been incorporated into the judgment, a buyer of the bonds would also need an assignment of the judgment to obtain the full set of creditor rights. The plaintiffs said that the uncertainty over whether such an assignment was permitted under sanctions reduced the bonds’ liquidity.
Legal standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for another reason that justifies relief, when extraordinary circumstances or extreme and undue hardship warrant it. The motion must also be made within a reasonable time. Rule 41(a)(2) allows a court to dismiss an action voluntarily on proper terms, generally when the dismissal will not prejudice the defendant.
Court’s analysis
The court held that vacating the default judgment was appropriate under Rule 60(b)(6). It found extraordinary circumstances because the plaintiffs were seeking to cancel a judgment that they had won, an unusual situation resulting from Venezuela’s failure to pay and the prolonged sanctions. Those conditions made the judgment practically worthless despite the plaintiffs’ efforts to enforce it.
The court also found extreme and undue hardship. The sanctions prevented enforcement and made it more difficult for the plaintiffs to deal efficiently with the bonds. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ representation that the lack of clarity about assigning the judgment harmed their ability to trade the bonds.
The court concluded that the motion was filed within a reasonable time. The plaintiffs had tried to enforce the judgment for years and sought relief after it became clear that they were unlikely to recover through the Delaware sale process. The court further found that vacating the judgment would not prejudice Venezuela; instead, it would relieve Venezuela of a court order requiring payment of more than one billion dollars. The court also found limited public interest in preserving this particular judgment because it did not establish a precedential decision or affect nonparties.
The court separately determined that dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) was appropriate. It found that dismissal would not harm Venezuela and noted that the possibility of refiling did not provide a valid reason to deny the plaintiffs’ request.
Disposition
The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate their default judgment and voluntarily dismiss their claims. It vacated the default judgment entered at ECF 34 and dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs’ claims against Venezuela. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion at ECF 42.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.