Karasik-Tosk v. O'Malley

Background

Regina Karasik-Tosk appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying disability insurance benefits under Title II for the period from November 14, 2013, through November 10, 2015. A prior administrative law judge had found her disabled beginning November 11, 2015, but the third administrative law judge, identified as ALJ Kelsey, found that she was not disabled during the earlier disputed period.

Karasik-Tosk argued that ALJ Kelsey improperly evaluated parts of her symptom testimony and the opinions of Drs. Galina Balon and Patti Allen. She also argued that the judge improperly translated state-agency psychologists’ opinions into work limitations, identified jobs inconsistent with her residual functional capacity, and asked incomplete questions of the vocational witness. The parties agreed that a remand was appropriate, but Karasik-Tosk sought an immediate award of benefits while the Commissioner requested further proceedings.

Legal standard

The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s credit-as-true rule, which can allow a court to order benefits instead of sending a case back for more administrative review. The rule generally asks whether the administrative law judge rejected evidence without legally sufficient reasons, whether the record is fully developed and free from important conflicts or ambiguities, and whether the claimant would be found disabled if the rejected evidence were accepted as true. Even when those requirements are met, a court may order further proceedings if the record creates serious doubt about disability.

Court’s analysis

The court concluded that the record contained conflicts and ambiguities that prevented an immediate award of benefits. Medical records included normal neurological findings, mild hip arthritis, and minimal knee pathology. State-agency reviewers found that Karasik-Tosk could sit for six hours during a workday, and a later report stated that sitting alleviated much of her pain. Those findings conflicted with her alleged inability to sit for more than 35 minutes and raised questions about the severity of her limitations during the disputed period.

The court also held that Karasik-Tosk could not relitigate her challenge to the treatment of Drs. Balon and Allen’s opinions. In prior related proceedings, the issue had already been decided against her, and she identified no new evidence or applicable exception. The court therefore did not treat those opinions as true for purposes of ordering benefits.

Regarding the state-agency psychologists’ opinions, the court stated that translating medical opinions into concrete residual-functional-capacity limitations is generally the administrative law judge’s task. Any error concerning the distinction between critical and constructive supervision would support further proceedings, not an immediate award of benefits.

The court did not decide whether the jobs identified at the fifth step were legally inconsistent with Karasik-Tosk’s residual functional capacity. It stated that any conflict between the residual functional capacity and the step-five job findings required further proceedings to resolve. The court also rejected the argument that a third remand was improper because the record did not clearly establish entitlement to benefits.

Disposition

The court denied Karasik-Tosk’s motion for summary judgment to the extent she sought an instruction to award benefits and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion to remand for further proceedings. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for proceedings consistent with the order.