Sexton v. Department of Homeless Services

Background

Charles H.M.S. Sexton filed the action without a lawyer and was permitted to proceed without prepaying filing fees. He asserted claims for damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief under Section 1983, the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Title VII, federal criminal statutes, and state law. The court also read the complaint as asserting claims under the Rehabilitation Act, Section 1981, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Sexton named New York City agencies and officials, homeless shelters, private social-services organizations, a private security firm, and numerous shelter and government employees. He sued the individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities. He also appeared to assert claims for other homeless residents.

Claims dismissed at screening

Because Sexton was proceeding without prepaying fees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court must dismiss claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, seek relief from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court dismissed without prejudice any claims Sexton asserted on behalf of other people because a nonlawyer cannot represent other people in federal court. It dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction claims seeking federal criminal prosecution of defendants because private plaintiffs cannot initiate federal criminal prosecutions.

The court dismissed the HIPAA, Title VII, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act claims for failure to state a claim. The court stated that the complaint alleged no facts supporting the Title VII, disability-discrimination, or Rehabilitation Act claims, and that HIPAA does not provide a private right to sue.

The court dismissed claims against the New York City agencies and Section 1983 claims against New York City officials in their official capacities because the agencies could not be sued under the New York City Charter and official-capacity claims against municipal officers are treated as claims against the City itself. The court treated those claims as claims against the City of New York and separately dismissed them because Sexton did not allege a City policy, custom, or practice that caused a constitutional violation.

The court also dismissed Section 1983 claims based on an alleged constitutional right to housing, including safe and sanitary housing, because the Constitution does not provide a general right to housing. It dismissed claims based on alleged failures to protect Sexton or investigate his concerns because there is generally no constitutional duty to protect an individual from harm or conduct an investigation. The court found that Sexton did not allege either recognized exception: that officials had taken him into custody or that they had affirmatively created or increased a danger to him.

The court dismissed Section 1983 claims against the named shelters because shelters are not persons subject to Section 1983 liability. It dismissed claims against the private organizations and employees because Sexton did not allege facts showing that they were acting under color of state law. It also dismissed claims against the individual New York City officials in their individual capacities because Sexton did not allege their direct and personal involvement in the claimed constitutional violations.

Claims allowed to proceed or to be amended

The court found that Sexton may have alleged enough facts to state discrimination or retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act and/or Section 1981 against McBride, Henderson, David or Davis, the Volunteers of America, Westhab, Project Renewal, and Breaking Ground. It directed the Clerk of Court and the United States Marshals Service to serve those defendants. The court did not make a final merits determination on those claims.

The court granted Sexton 30 days to file an amended complaint asserting specified Section 1983 claims against the City of New York, the New York City officials, and security personnel. The amendment could address the City’s alleged policy, custom, or practice; the officials’ direct and personal involvement; and facts showing that security personnel were state actors. The court also allowed an amended Section 1983 claim against Tarian if Tarian employed the relevant security personnel and its policies caused the alleged violations. The court stated that an amended complaint would replace the original complaint rather than supplement it, and set June 6, 2025, as the filing deadline.

Motions and other rulings

The court denied the motion to transfer venue as moot because the action was already pending in the Southern District of New York. It denied the requests to compel or expedite rulings and the request for an expedited case-status update as moot. It denied the pre-discovery motion without prejudice as premature and unnecessary, while stating that Sexton could seek discovery-related relief later after the defendants to be served were served.

The court had previously denied Sexton’s request for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In this order, it explained that Sexton had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, sufficiently serious questions for litigation, or a balance of hardships favoring relief. He had sought orders barring evidence destruction, harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and contact within 1,000 feet, but the court found no allegations showing that defendants had engaged in or were about to engage in those actions.

The court denied the motion for appointed counsel without prejudice because it was too early to assess the merits. It stated that Sexton could later apply for the court to request volunteer legal representation. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for an appeal.