Dyer v. Ezeh

Background

Min Ji Goo Dyer, who was proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that she was the victim of a cryptocurrency scam carried out through email and text messages. Because she could not identify the people involved, she initially named John Does 1-10 as defendants. Through third-party discovery, she obtained information connecting Chike Ezeh to an account into which she had deposited funds that were later stolen. She filed an amended complaint naming Ezeh and asked for permission to serve him in Nigeria by emailing the complaint to glee.fuller.og@gmail.com.

Legal standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) provides methods for serving an individual in a foreign country. One method permits a court to order another means of service if an international agreement does not prohibit it. The proposed method must satisfy due process, meaning it must be reasonably calculated under the circumstances to notify the defendant about the case and give the defendant an opportunity to respond.

The court stated that no international agreement governed service in Nigeria or prohibited service by email there. Therefore, the question was whether emailing the complaint to the identified address was reasonably calculated to notify Ezeh.

Court’s analysis

The record showed that the alleged scam perpetrators had communicated with Dyer from support@tfxcmarkets.com. But there was no evidence that Dyer had ever received an email from glee.fuller.og@gmail.com or that the address had been used for communications related to the scam.

The only evidence linking Ezeh to the address was customer information and an approved-devices list produced by Binance. Although Dyer argued that the records showed the address was last used on February 3, 2025, the court found that the records did not clearly establish that an email address was required for the relevant logins. Even assuming the listed dates reflected logins requiring use of the email address, the records would show only three uses over nearly four years.

The court contrasted these facts with cases approving email service where the address was the defendant’s designated business contact or where the defendant had used the address to communicate about the litigation. The court also discussed a case denying email service when the record did not show that the defendant monitored the proposed address.

The court found that alternative service was warranted in general, but that the evidence was insufficient to show that this particular email address was a reliable way to notify Ezeh. The court noted that Dyer had also uncovered an address and mobile telephone number that might support another method of service, such as service through an agent in Nigeria, registered mail, or letters rogatory.

Disposition

Judge Joseph C. Spero denied Dyer’s motion without prejudice to renewing it with additional information showing that the proposed method of service satisfies due process. Dyer could renew the motion by supporting another method with evidence of reliability or by showing that glee.fuller.og@gmail.com was in regular use and therefore likely to provide notice. The court set August 8, 2025, as the deadline for a renewed motion unless it granted an extension for good cause based on specified efforts to obtain additional evidence.