Arundell v. United Federation of Teachers

Background

The United Federation of Teachers (UFT) is a local labor organization covered by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Plaintiff A Better Contract Slate is an unincorporated association that runs candidates for UFT office. Plaintiff Amy Arundell, a UFT member and New York City public school teacher, was nominated as the slate’s candidate for UFT president.

On April 16, 2025, UFT President Michael Mulgrew sent an email to UFT retirees discussing Medicare, proposed legislation concerning retiree healthcare, pensions, and the union’s response to what UFT described as misinformation. The email did not mention Arundell, A Better Contract Slate, another candidate, or the upcoming UFT presidential election. Plaintiffs claimed that the email was campaign literature under 29 U.S.C. § 481(c), which would have required UFT to provide them an equal opportunity to distribute campaign material.

Plaintiffs also sought permission to send a campaign email to UFT members at their own expense. Arundell sent a request on April 27, 2025. At the May 1 hearing, UFT agreed to process the request and provide information about costs and logistics.

Legal standard

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary order issued before a final judgment. The party seeking one must clearly show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without the injunction, a favorable balance of hardships, and that the injunction serves the public interest. Because plaintiffs sought to change, rather than preserve, the existing situation, the court applied the requirement of a clear or substantial likelihood of success.

Section 481(c) contains two relevant protections. First, a labor organization must comply with reasonable requests from candidates to distribute campaign literature at the candidate’s expense. Second, when a labor organization authorizes distribution of campaign literature for a candidate or for the organization itself, it must provide similar distribution to another bona fide candidate with equal treatment regarding expenses.

Ruling on the email sent by UFT

The court held that the April 16 email was not campaign literature. Although its timing—two weeks before ballots were mailed—supported plaintiffs’ position, timing alone was not enough. The court considered the email’s overall timing, tone, content, and context.

The email did not refer to the election, Arundell, A Better Contract Slate, or any other candidate. Its single reference to Mulgrew concerned his experience caring for his mother and did not amount to strong praise of an incumbent candidate. The court also found that the email’s distribution only to retirees matched its focus on issues important to retirees. References to federal attacks on unions and workers’ rights did not connect the email to the UFT election. The court therefore concluded that the email was an issue-focused communication from a union president addressing members, rather than electioneering.

Because plaintiffs did not show a clear or substantial likelihood of success on this claim, the court denied the preliminary injunction based on UFT’s distribution of the April 16 email. The court assumed, without deciding, that A Better Contract Slate was a proper plaintiff entitled to seek relief under section 481(c).

Ruling on plaintiffs’ requested email

The parties agreed that Arundell’s April 27 message was a request by both plaintiffs to send campaign literature at the plaintiffs’ expense. UFT did not argue that processing the request would create excessive administrative burdens or discriminate against another candidate. UFT agreed to process the request and provide cost and logistical information.

The court found the request reasonable and granted the preliminary injunction on this claim. At the May 1 hearing, the court ordered UFT to provide the plaintiffs with cost and logistical information by May 2 at 10 a.m., required the plaintiffs to provide their proposed campaign email by May 2 at noon, and ordered UFT to send the email to the appropriate recipients by May 7. The court stated that the oral ruling was without prejudice to either side raising issues inconsistent with the ruling, but neither party later raised such issues.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It denied the request based on the April 16 UFT email and granted the request concerning distribution of plaintiffs’ campaign email at the plaintiffs’ expense. The court directed the clerk to terminate the preliminary-injunction motion and a letter motion for oral argument.