IN RE CIM-SQ TRANSFER CASES

Background

The plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that defendants transferred more than 100 prisoners, some infected with COVID-19, from the California Institution for Men to San Quentin State Prison in May 2020. He further alleged that defendants failed to use adequate precautions before, during, and after the transfer, including testing, symptom screening, distancing, isolation, masking, and other public-health measures. The plaintiff alleged that San Quentin’s COVID-19 cases increased substantially after the transfer and that he became infected in July 2020.

The complaint named the State of California, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, San Quentin State Prison, Ralph Diaz, the Estate of Robert S. Tharratt, Ronald Davis, Ronald Broomfield, Clarence Cryer, Alison Pachynski, Shannon Garrigan, Louie Escobell, Muhammad Farooq, Kirk Torres, and Does 1 through 20. The plaintiff sued the individual defendants in their individual capacities. He sought declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and costs.

The case had previously been dismissed because the plaintiff did not file an application to proceed without prepaying the filing fee or pay the correct filing fee. The plaintiff then moved to reopen the case and submitted an application to proceed without prepaying fees. The case is part of a consolidated group of cases concerning the 2020 prisoner transfers.

Screening and Claims

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief from governmental defendants, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. At this stage, the court determines whether the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks money from an immune defendant. The court also applies a liberal reading to complaints filed without a lawyer.

The court found cognizable, meaning legally sufficient to proceed past screening, Eighth Amendment claims against Diaz, the Estate of Tharratt, Davis, Broomfield, Cryer, Pachynski, Garrigan, Escobell, Farooq, and Torres. The claims alleged deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s health and safety needs, including through supervisory liability.

The court also found cognizable claims under California Civil Code section 52.1, known as the Bane Act, against those same defendants. The court concluded that the allegations, liberally construed, supported an inference that the defendants acted with reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

The court found a cognizable Rehabilitation Act claim against the State of California, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and San Quentin State Prison. The plaintiff alleged that he had health conditions including a heart condition, diabetes, and obesity, and that these defendants failed to provide accommodations related to the COVID-19 conditions. The court noted that race and age are not disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act but concluded that the alleged health conditions could support the claim at the screening stage.

The court also found a cognizable state-law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the individual defendants listed above. It reasoned that the plaintiff alleged a prisoner-and-jailer duty of care and alleged that emotional distress resulted from defendants’ breach of that duty by exposing him to COVID-19.

Order

The court granted the motion to reopen the case. It ordered service by the United States Marshals Service on the State of California through the Office of the Attorney General and ordered service through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic-service program for the other listed defendants. The order described procedures for determining which defendants would waive service and for serving those who did not.

The court stated that the consolidated prisoner cases would remain stayed except for service. It also stated that the individual docket for the plaintiff’s case had been closed and that future motions should be filed in the consolidated case using the plaintiff’s original case number.

This order allowed the identified claims to proceed to service; it did not decide the ultimate merits of those claims. The title of the provided order includes the phrase “VACATING JUDGMENT,” but the text provided separately states that the motion to reopen was granted and does not clearly set out a separate vacatur ruling.