Moralez v. State of California

Background

The plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims for violations of federal rights by people acting under state authority. He alleged that defendants transferred more than 100 prisoners from the California Institution for Men to San Quentin State Prison in May 2020, including prisoners infected with COVID-19.

The plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to take adequate precautions before, during, and after the transfer. The alleged failures included not testing or screening prisoners at appropriate times, not using distancing measures on transfer buses, not testing and isolating transferred prisoners after arrival, not following public-health recommendations, failing to provide adequate protective equipment and masks, and refusing offers of free COVID-19 testing. He alleged that San Quentin went from having no COVID-19 cases to 499 cases over three weeks, later had more than 2,000 prisoner cases, and experienced 26 prisoner deaths. He also alleged that he became infected with COVID-19 in July 2020.

The complaint named the State of California; the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Ralph Diaz; the Estate of Robert S. Tharratt; Ronald Davis; Ronald Broomfield; Clarence Cryer; Alison Pachynski; Shannon Garrigan; Louie Escobell; Muhammad Farooq; Kirk Torres; and Does 1 through 20. The plaintiff sued the individual defendants in their individual capacities.

Earlier dismissal and reopening

The court had previously dismissed the plaintiff’s action because he had not filed an application to proceed without paying the filing fee or paid the correct filing fee. The plaintiff later moved to reopen the case and submitted an application to proceed without paying the filing fee.

The court granted the motion to reopen. It stated that the case was then subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires courts to review prisoner complaints against government entities or officials and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also stated that it would interpret a complaint filed without a lawyer generously, while requiring enough factual allegations to make a claim plausible.

The case had been consolidated with other cases concerning the 2020 prisoner transfers. The court stated that the individual prisoner cases were stayed except for service of the complaints. The plaintiff’s individual docket and the other individual dockets were closed, and any future motions in this matter must be filed in the consolidated case using the plaintiff’s original case number as directed by the court.

Claims found adequate for screening

The court found that the allegations stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Ralph Diaz, the Estate of Robert S. Tharratt, Ronald Davis, Ronald Broomfield, Clarence Cryer, Alison Pachynski, Shannon Garrigan, Louie Escobell, Muhammad Farooq, and Kirk Torres. The claim was based on alleged deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s health and safety needs concerning the transfer and COVID-19 conditions. A cognizable claim is one that is adequate to proceed past the initial screening stage; the finding did not decide that the defendants were liable.

The court also found that the plaintiff stated a cognizable claim under California Civil Code section 52.1, commonly called the Bane Act, against those same defendants. The court explained that the law concerns interference with rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion and that reckless disregard for constitutional rights can support the required specific intent. The court concluded, after construing the complaint generously, that the alleged reckless disregard was sufficient at the screening stage.

The court found a cognizable Rehabilitation Act claim against the State of California, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and San Quentin State Prison. The plaintiff alleged that he had a heart condition, diabetes, obesity, and advanced age, and that these health conditions were disabilities under the Act. The court stated that race and age alone are not disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act, but concluded that the alleged health conditions could qualify. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations and thereby exposed him to a greater risk of COVID-19 than nondisabled prisoners.

The court also found a cognizable state-law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Although California does not recognize that claim as an independent tort, the court explained that it may be pursued when emotional distress results from the breach of another legal duty. The court found that the alleged duty owed to the plaintiff as a prisoner and the alleged exposure to COVID-19 were sufficient at the screening stage.

Service and case status

The court ordered the United States Marshals Service to serve the State of California through the Office of the Attorney General. It ordered service on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, San Quentin State Prison, and the listed individual defendants through the department’s electronic-service program for prisoner civil-rights cases.

The order required the department to report which defendants would waive service and which would not waive service or could not be reached. The court warned defendants that they could be required to pay service costs if they failed to cooperate with a request to waive service without good cause.

The case remains stayed for all purposes other than service of the complaint. The plaintiff remains responsible for prosecuting the case, following court orders, keeping the court informed of address changes, and serving defendants or their counsel with communications filed in the case.

Disposition

Judge Edward J. Davila granted the plaintiff’s motion to reopen the case. The court found the specified Eighth Amendment, California Civil Code section 52.1, negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress, and Rehabilitation Act claims cognizable as described above, ordered service, and directed that the case remain stayed except for service. The order did not decide the ultimate merits or liability of any defendant.