Smith v. Adams

Background

Ismail Ibn Smith, proceeding without a lawyer, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims against people acting for the government who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights. He sued New York City Mayor Eric Adams; Department of Homeless Services Commissioner Molly Wasow Park and a DHS representative identified as Jane Doe; and Bowery Residents Committee (BRC) President Lawrence Rosenblatt, BRC facility directors and a supervisor identified as John Does #1-3, and a BRC security guard identified as John Doe #5.

Smith alleged that, while staying at BRC facilities, he had conflicts with roommates, was transferred from a Manhattan facility to a Queens facility, was removed from the Queens facility by police after a dispute with a BRC security guard, and later had his stay terminated after the facility director told him he had made sexual comments to a housing specialist. He also alleged that he lost a Social Security card and birth certificate and that his bicycle was stolen. Smith claimed violations of the First, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and sought damages.

The court had previously allowed Smith to proceed without paying filing fees in advance. Under the federal screening statute, the court was required to dismiss a complaint that was frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, sought money from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s jurisdiction. The court also explained that although it must read a self-represented person’s complaint liberally, the complaint still must provide enough facts to make a claim plausible.

Claims Against BRC Defendants

The court dismissed Smith’s § 1983 claims against the BRC defendants for failure to state a claim. A § 1983 claim requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law—that is, as a state actor—and violated a federal right. The court stated that private parties generally are not liable under § 1983.

Because the BRC defendants were employed by BRC, which the court described as a private nonprofit organization, and Smith did not allege facts showing that they were state actors, the court found that he had not stated a § 1983 claim against them. The court specifically noted that the allegation that the BRC security guard called police after a conflict did not, by itself, show that the guard exercised police powers or acted as a state actor.

Claims Against Adams and Park

The court dismissed the claims against Mayor Adams and Commissioner Park. For individual-capacity claims under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the constitutional violation. Smith did not mention Commissioner Park in the body of his complaint, and the court found that his allegation that he sent a complaint to Mayor Adams did not establish Adams’s personal involvement.

The court also considered possible official-capacity claims, which are treated as claims against the City of New York. Such a claim requires facts showing that a City policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation. The court found that Smith had not alleged such a policy, custom, or practice.

To the extent Smith challenged his referral or transfer to BRC under the Due Process Clause, the court held that he did not have a constitutional or statutory property interest in placement in a particular type of shelter. The court also stated that Smith’s allegations did not implicate the Eighth Amendment, which applies to convicted prisoners, or the Tenth Amendment, which concerns powers reserved to the states.

Claim Against DHS Representative Jane Doe

The court dismissed Smith’s claim against Jane Doe. Smith apparently alleged that she failed to stop his transfer to the BRC facility in Queens and failed to place him in an apprenticeship program. The court found that he did not allege a protected property interest in either benefit. A protected property interest requires more than a general desire or expectation; it requires a legitimate entitlement to the benefit.

The court further stated that, even if Smith had been deprived of a protected property right through an unauthorized act, due process could be satisfied by an adequate remedy after the deprivation. The court identified a proceeding under Article 78 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules as generally adequate for an improper agency decision. Smith’s allegations about his conversation with Jane Doe and her failure to follow up were therefore insufficient to state a due-process claim.

State-Law Claims

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Smith might be asserting. Supplemental jurisdiction is the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims in a case that also includes federal claims. The court stated that it generally should decline that authority when the federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage.

Disposition and Leave to Amend

The court dismissed Smith’s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days’ leave to replead. The court granted that opportunity because it was unclear whether Smith could allege additional facts that would state a valid claim. If Smith does not file an amended complaint within the allowed period, the court stated that the Clerk will be directed to enter judgment. Judge Louis L. Stanton directed the Clerk to keep the matter open on the docket until judgment is entered.