Gold v. California Highway Patrol
- Lin
- 3:23-cv-03414
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Gold v. California Highway Patrol, Judge Lin denied Gold’s request to seek reconsideration of summary judgment rulings involving Officers Weaver and Cho.
Liza Gold’s request for reconsideration was denied; the order left unchanged the earlier rulings concerning her Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Weaver and Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Cho.
What happened
In Gold v. California Highway Patrol, Liza Gold asked for permission to file a motion reconsidering parts of an earlier summary judgment order. She relied on a recent Supreme Court decision and sought to revive a Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Weaver and a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Cho.
The court said the Supreme Court decision used the same Fourth Amendment standard as the earlier order. It concluded that Officer Weaver reasonably believed shots were being fired from the bathroom and that earlier tactical decisions did not change that conclusion. The court also said the decision did not address the standard for Liza Gold’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Cho.
Judge Rita F. Lin denied the request for leave to file a reconsideration motion. The order did not change the earlier summary judgment rulings.
The detailed version
- Gold v. California Highway Patrol · No. 3:23-cv-03414
- Lin
- May 20, 2025
Background
On May 19, 2025, Liza Gold requested permission to file a motion asking the court to reconsider parts of its earlier summary judgment order. She relied on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barnes v. Felix. Gold argued that her Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Weaver and her Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Cho should be revived.
Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Weaver
The court explained that Barnes applies the same standard used in the earlier summary judgment order. In an excessive-force case under the Fourth Amendment, the question is whether the officer’s actions were reasonable at the time of the use of force. The court may consider the total circumstances, including earlier events that help explain what a reasonable officer would have understood, but the situation at the precise time of the shooting often matters most.
The earlier order had already considered events before the confrontation in the bathroom. The court said those events could bear on whether a reasonable officer would view Ari Gold’s actions as a serious threat justifying deadly force. But the court concluded that the undisputed facts showed Officer Weaver reasonably believed that shots were being fired from the bathroom. According to the order, Weaver heard Officer Cho’s escalating commands, saw Cho back out of the bathroom, and heard a shot shatter a mirror near his head.
The court further concluded that earlier tactical decisions did not change the result. Before the bathroom confrontation, the officers had no indication that Ari Gold was armed and did not know with certainty that Gold was inside the house. Even if entering the house rather than using a loudspeaker or waiting for backup was ill-advised and increased the likelihood of a dangerous encounter, the court said no reasonable juror could find that the earlier decision eliminated Weaver’s right to respond to what he reasonably believed was unexpected deadly force.
The court also stated that Barnes did not change the analysis of the “clearly established” part of the Fourth Amendment claim. That inquiry concerns whether the law was clearly established when the challenged conduct occurred in 2019.
Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Cho
The court said Barnes did not address the standard for analyzing a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. It therefore concluded that Barnes did not provide a basis for reconsidering Gold’s claim against Officer Cho.
Disposition and classification
The court denied Liza Gold’s request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. This order concerns whether the court would reconsider its earlier ruling; it did not grant permission to file the proposed motion or alter the earlier summary judgment order. The order is classified as a procedural order because the court denied an ancillary reconsideration request rather than issuing a new ruling on the underlying claims.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.