UnifySCC v. Cody

Background

The lawsuit challenged Santa Clara County’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement and its process for accommodating County employees who received religious exemptions. The County used a Risk Tier System that categorized positions as low-, medium-, or high-risk for COVID-19 transmission. The court had previously certified a class of 463 employees who, among other things, had received religious exemptions, held high-risk jobs, and were covered by the County’s policies between August 5, 2021, and September 27, 2022.

During later summary-judgment briefing, the record showed that class members had significantly different experiences. More than half never went on leave, 309 never applied for an alternative position, and some declined offers to move to lower-risk positions. The County therefore moved to decertify the class. The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

Legal standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 allows a court to change a class-certification order before final judgment. Decertification generally requires good cause, including the discovery of new facts or developments showing that the class no longer satisfies Rule 23.

Rule 23(a) requires numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), common questions must predominate over individual questions, and a class action must be superior to other available methods of resolving the dispute.

Reasons for decertification

The court found good cause to reconsider certification because the evidence developed during the litigation differed from the court’s earlier understanding of what had happened. The court declined to decide the County’s separate “ascertainability” argument and instead considered those concerns within the Rule 23 analysis.

The court also discussed Article III standing, which requires a plaintiff to show a concrete injury caused by the defendant that judicial relief could likely remedy. The court stated that the plaintiffs had not yet shown that all class members suffered an actual injury. The evidence did not establish that every employee who became vaccinated did so because of coercion, and the plaintiffs had not shown why the 309 employees who never sought alternative positions were concretely injured. The court did not directly decide whether every absent class member had standing, but stated that standing would be an issue for each plaintiff who continued the case.

The court concluded that the first certified question—concerning alleged violations of free-exercise and equal-protection rights based on prioritizing medical or disability exemptions—did not satisfy commonality. The experiences of class members differed, and the question of whether an individual’s rights were violated required a case-by-case determination.

The second certified question had already been resolved for the County at summary judgment, so it did not justify keeping the class certified. The third question, concerning whether the County’s exemption and accommodation procedure was subject to strict scrutiny, presented a common legal issue, but the court had already resolved it and found that it would not drive the remaining litigation.

The fourth certified question concerned whether the County provided reasonable religious accommodations under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The court held that answering this question required individualized inquiries, including whether a particular employee suffered an adverse employment action, whether leave was connected to the requested religious accommodation, whether the County made good-faith accommodation efforts, whether an accommodation would impose substantial increased costs, and whether a transfer materially affected the employee’s pay or benefits.

The fifth certified question concerned alleged hostility toward religion under the Establishment Clause. The court found that the County’s interactions with class members varied and that determining whether the County’s conduct violated the Establishment Clause would require individualized analysis.

The court also found that individual questions predominated under Rule 23(b)(3). Determining liability would require employee-by-employee review of the parties’ conduct and interactions during the accommodation process, along with case-specific consideration of the County’s conduct under Establishment Clause principles.

Disposition

The court granted the County’s Motion for Class Decertification and decertified the class. It declined to modify the class definition. The court ordered that Tom Davis, Maria Ramirez, and Elizabeth Baluyut may each proceed on an individual basis.

The court separately dismissed UNIFYSCC. The opinion states that UNIFYSCC conceded it no longer had standing because its claims for prospective relief had become moot. The order does not state that this dismissal was with or without prejudice.