LeadingAge Minnesota v. Blissenbach

Background

LeadingAge Minnesota and Care Providers of Minnesota, described as nonprofit associations representing member organizations, sued Nicole Blissenbach in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry. They challenged a Minnesota Nursing Home Workforce Standards Board rule requiring nursing-home employers to pay nursing-home workers at least time-and-a-half for all hours worked on 11 designated holidays, beginning January 1, 2025.

The rule also allows an employer to change the start or end time of a holiday or substitute up to four holidays with other days, if a majority of affected nursing-home workers or their exclusive representative agrees. The amended complaint alleged that the rule was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), meaning that federal law displaced the state rule. The complaint also alleged that the rule was unconstitutionally vague, but the plaintiffs abandoned that claim.

The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, a court order temporarily blocking the rule. The Commissioner moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a legally valid preemption claim.

Standing

The court rejected the standing challenge. The plaintiffs relied on associational standing, under which an organization may sue on behalf of its members if at least one member would have standing individually, the interests involved relate to the organization’s purpose, and the claim and requested relief do not require individual members’ participation.

The plaintiffs submitted declarations from representatives of four nursing-home organizations describing increased wage costs, administrative burdens, and issues involving union and nonunion employees. A later declaration stated that the identified organizations were members of one of the plaintiff associations. The court accepted these materials as evidence that the associations had members directly affected by the rule. It therefore denied the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss on standing grounds.

NLRA Preemption

The court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because their preemption theory was legally unavailable. It considered both recognized forms of NLRA preemption.

Under Garmon preemption, states generally may not regulate conduct that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits. The plaintiffs argued that the rule’s date-flexibility provision could lead employers to violate Section 8(a)(2), which prohibits employers from dominating or interfering with the formation or administration of a labor organization. They also argued that the provision interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights to refrain from union activity and collective bargaining.

The court rejected those arguments. It held that the rule does not require or create a labor organization, because employees need only approve a holiday change and do not have to form an organization. The rule also does not require the continuing, bilateral dealings or negotiations that the National Labor Relations Board has associated with a labor organization. The court further held that the rule does not require bargaining, so it does not strip individual employees of a right to refrain from collective bargaining. The court declined to invalidate the rule based on hypothetical future violations that the rule itself does not require or authorize.

Under Machinists preemption, states may not regulate conduct that Congress intended to leave unregulated and subject to economic forces and collective bargaining. The court held that the holiday-pay rule is instead a minimum labor standard. It applies equally to union and nonunion employees, requires time-and-a-half pay on 11 holidays, covers nursing-home workers throughout Minnesota, and does not regulate the collective-bargaining process or encourage or discourage unionization.

The court distinguished cases in which state laws were found to intrude more directly into bargaining, including laws that effectively dictated negotiated wage packages, gave employees leverage over unrelated employment benefits, or substituted the state for a bargaining representative. The court concluded that the Minnesota rule does not run afoul of either Garmon or Machinists preemption.

Disposition

The court held that the plaintiffs did not allege a legally cognizable theory that the rule is preempted by the NLRA. It granted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Because the plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed their only other claim, the court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety without prejudice. It denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.

The order states:

- The Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint was GRANTED. - The plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction was DENIED AS MOOT. - The amended complaint was DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.