Siomkos v. Beckerman

Background

Stella M. Siomkos, who represented herself, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages and injunctive relief. She sued Lisa G. Beckerman, a United States Bankruptcy Judge, in her official and individual capacities; Albert Togut, the Chapter 7 trustee in her bankruptcy case, in his official and individual capacities; Togut, Segal & Segal LLP, the law firm through which Togut conducted his activities; and unidentified individuals or entities.

Siomkos alleged that an attorney filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for her without her informed consent, that later filings and proceedings were unauthorized or improper, and that the case was converted to Chapter 7. She alleged that Judge Beckerman presided improperly, that Togut and his law firm took actions concerning her home, and that she faced removal from the home under an order authorizing the United States Marshals to remove her. She also alleged financial and emotional harm. The opinion states that she had appealed the conversion order in a related case and that a motion for emergency relief in that case remained pending.

Claims Against Judge Beckerman

The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against Judge Beckerman under judicial immunity and as frivolous. Judicial immunity generally protects judges from civil damages claims based on actions taken within their judicial responsibilities, even when the plaintiff alleges bad faith or malice. The court also held that the immunity barred Siomkos’s request for injunctive relief. It found no facts suggesting that Judge Beckerman acted outside her judicial role or without jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case. The court additionally noted that § 1983 applies to conduct under color of state law, while Judge Beckerman is a federal judicial officer.

The court declined to allow amendment of the claims against Judge Beckerman because it concluded that their defects could not be cured by amendment.

Claims Against the Trustee Defendants

The court dismissed the claims against Togut and Togut, Segal & Segal LLP for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Barton doctrine. That doctrine generally requires a person to obtain permission from the bankruptcy court before bringing another-court claims against a bankruptcy trustee for actions taken as part of the trustee’s official duties. The opinion states that the doctrine also applies to suits against a trustee’s retained law firm.

Siomkos did not allege that she requested or obtained permission from the Bankruptcy Court before filing this action. The court also rejected the stated statutory exception for a trustee carrying on business connected with the bankruptcy property because Siomkos alleged no such business activities. The court granted leave to amend these claims only if Siomkos could show that the Bankruptcy Court had granted permission to file the action.

Claims Against the John Does

The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against the John Does for failure to state a claim. A § 1983 claim requires allegations that a constitutional or federal-law right was violated by a person acting under color of state law. The court found that Siomkos did not allege that the John Does were state actors or facts showing the special circumstances needed to treat private conduct as state action.

The court granted leave to amend the claims against the John Does. Siomkos could proceed by alleging a cause of action other than § 1983 or by pleading facts showing that the John Does were state actors.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims that the complaint could be understood to assert. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s discretionary authority to hear related state-law claims after federal claims are present; the court declined to use that authority here.

The court dismissed the action. Siomkos could file an amended complaint by June 23, 2025, but could not re-plead her claims against Judge Beckerman. The court also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status.