Clark v. New York City Housing Authority
- Analisa Torres
- 1:24-cv-01625
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 3
In Clark v. New York City Housing Authority, Judge Torres denied motions to change or vacate the judgment and rejected Clark’s recusal arguments.
La’Shaun Clark’s post-judgment motions were denied, leaving the earlier dismissal of her claims in place; the defendants were not required to litigate those claims further in this order.
What happened
In Clark v. New York City Housing Authority, La’Shaun Clark, representing herself, challenged an earlier order that dismissed her claims against the New York City Housing Authority, New York Insulation & Environmental Services, Inc., and JLC Environmental Consultants, Inc. Her claims involved alleged exposure to crystalline silica in her former apartment.
Clark asked the court to change the judgment, remove the judges from the case, and vacate the earlier rulings. She argued that the court had overlooked her objections and that various connections involving the judges, their law clerks, their families, former employers, and AIG created conflicts. The court concluded that she identified no overlooked law or facts and that the alleged connections were too weak to require recusal.
Judge Analisa Torres adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied Clark’s motions at docket entries 81 and 91. The court also warned that continued duplicative filings could lead to a permanent filing restriction.
The detailed version
- Clark v. New York City Housing Authority · No. 1:24-cv-01625
- Analisa Torres
- May 30, 2025
Background
La’Shaun Clark, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the New York City Housing Authority, New York Insulation & Environmental Services, Inc., and JLC Environmental Consultants, Inc. She alleged negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and sought compensation for medical-monitoring costs related to alleged exposure to crystalline silica in her former apartment.
In an earlier order, the court adopted a report and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Robyn F. Tarnofsky and dismissed Clark’s claims with prejudice. Clark appealed. She then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment and sought recusal of Judge Torres and Judge Tarnofsky. Judge Tarnofsky recommended denying those motions. Clark objected and also moved under Rule 60(b)(3) and (b)(6) to vacate the earlier reports, order, and judgment.
Legal standards
A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted only in limited circumstances, such as when the court overlooked controlling law or important facts. It is not a vehicle for relitigating issues or presenting new theories.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a federal judge must recuse herself when her impartiality might reasonably be questioned or when specified personal, family, or financial interests are involved. The standard is whether an objective, informed observer would have significant doubt that justice could be done without recusal.
Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final judgment for reasons including fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct, or another reason justifying relief.
Analysis
The court rejected Clark’s Rule 59(e) arguments. It found that she had not identified any case law or facts overlooked in the earlier order. The court also explained that its earlier decision independently determined that Clark’s claims were barred by collateral estoppel, meaning that an earlier determination prevented relitigation of the claims. Because that issue resolved the action, the court did not need to address every objection separately. The court overruled Clark’s objections to the second report and recommendation and denied the Rule 59(e) motion.
The court also rejected Clark’s recusal arguments. It concluded that the alleged connection between Judge Tarnofsky’s law clerk and an attorney for JLC did not exist as Clark described it. It further concluded that alleged past connections between Judge Torres’s family and the Housing Authority, and an alleged past financial interest in AIG, were too tenuous to require recusal. Clark’s Rule 60 motion raised additional alleged connections, including Judge Tarnofsky’s former employment at a law firm that sometimes represented the Housing Authority and prior representation involving AIG. The court again found those connections too tenuous to justify relief. The opinion also states that the Rule 60 motion was untimely and did not rely on facts outside the public record.
Disposition
The court adopted the second report and recommendation in its entirety and denied Clark’s motions at docket entries 81 and 91. The Clerk was directed to terminate those motions. Judge Torres warned that continued duplicative filings could lead to a permanent filing injunction against Clark.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.