Miller v. Apple, Inc.

Background

John Williams Miller, proceeding without a lawyer, filed this copyright-infringement action against Apple, Inc. He filed an amended complaint the day after filing the original complaint. Over the following months, he submitted hundreds of filings, including allegations of judicial misconduct and a nationwide conspiracy, assertions that Apple owed him $1.5 trillion based on a supposed default judgment, and filings attempting to direct the Clerk of Court and the United States Marshals Service.

Miller had previously sued Apple in the District of South Carolina. That case ended after the district court granted Apple summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Miller later sued Apple in the District of Massachusetts and in Massachusetts state courts; those matters were dismissed. In the present case, Apple timely filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). The court found that Apple was never in default and that no default judgment had been entered.

Motions to Amend and Recusal

Miller filed documents attempting to add various judges and a federal prosecutor as defendants and seeking recusal or disqualification of Judge Robyn F. Tarnofsky and Judge John P. Cronan. Judge Tarnofsky treated the filings as motions to amend and renewed recusal requests. Because Miller had already amended his complaint once, further amendment required Apple’s consent or the court’s permission. The court adopted Judge Tarnofsky’s recommendation that the motions to amend be denied because the proposed claims against judicial officers and a federal prosecutor would be barred by immunity and therefore amendment would be futile.

The court overruled Miller’s objections to that recommendation. It concluded that neither Judge Tarnofsky nor Judge Cronan was a defendant in the operative complaint, that Miller had not shown a basis requiring recusal, and that his proposed supplemental complaint had no operative effect because the court had not authorized it. The court also concluded that the proposed supplemental allegations concerning Miller’s grievances against judges were not sufficiently connected to the original copyright allegations.

The court denied Miller’s motions for reconsideration and renewed recusal. It also denied his motions for default judgment, explaining that Apple had timely filed its motion to dismiss on the response deadline and that the later filing of its attorneys’ notices of appearance did not make the motion ineffective. Two additional motions to amend, which sought to add Apple’s attorneys as defendants, were denied as futile because the proposed claims were frivolous.

Motion to Dismiss

Judge Tarnofsky recommended granting Apple’s motion to dismiss on two independent grounds: claim preclusion, which generally bars a party from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in an earlier case, and failure to adequately allege personal jurisdiction. She also recommended denying any request to enforce a supposed default judgment from the South Carolina case and denying leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

Miller did not timely file a document specifically identified as objections to the April 16, 2025 recommendation. The court therefore found that he had waived objections and appellate review, but it nevertheless reviewed his filings and considered his arguments. The court rejected his arguments that Apple had defaulted, that the South Carolina judgment was void, that Judge Tarnofsky lacked authority to issue a recommendation, and that Apple’s motion was invalid because its attorneys filed notices of appearance one day later.

The court then conducted its own review and began with personal jurisdiction because Apple had challenged the court’s authority over it. The court held that Miller had not adequately alleged either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction over Apple. It therefore granted Apple’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also stated that it agreed with the alternative claim-preclusion analysis and that, even if Miller could cure the jurisdictional allegations, leave to amend would be denied because the claims would be futile.

Filing Restrictions

The court separately considered Miller’s filing conduct. After prior warnings and an order requiring him to explain why a filing restriction should not be imposed, the court found that his response did not show why sanctions were inappropriate. It ordered the Clerk of Court not to accept or docket further filings from Miller in this matter without court permission. The court allowed one motion for reconsideration and/or one notice of appeal from the opinion and order.

Apple separately requested a nationwide filing injunction barring Miller and AppProved Software from filing civil actions against Apple and specified related people or entities in any court without first obtaining permission. The court acknowledged Miller’s history of frivolous litigation and the burden on courts, but concluded that a nationwide injunction was an extreme remedy and that lesser sanctions might be adequate. The court therefore declined to impose a nationwide filing injunction at that time.

Disposition

The court adopted Judge Tarnofsky’s April 7 and April 16, 2025 Reports and Recommendations. It granted Apple’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. It denied leave to amend or supplement the amended complaint, denied all other pending motions as moot, entered judgment in Apple’s favor, and closed the case. It also imposed the limited filing restriction described above.