Tamrat v. Mercardo

Background

Herman Tamrat, a pretrial detainee at San Francisco County Jail #2, filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while proceeding without a lawyer. He alleged that security guards beat him and San Francisco police officers shot him before his arrest. He further alleged that, while he was in severe pain and unable to walk, officers at a hospital and during jail booking refused to provide a wheelchair, forced him to put weight on his injured legs, twisted his arms and wrists, left him wearing only a hospital gown that exposed his genitalia and buttocks, and did not help him clean himself after he defecated.

Tamrat named Sergeant Kunaboot, Deputy Mercado, and Does 1–10 as defendants. He sought damages and asserted constitutional claims, civil-rights conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state-law claims for negligence, gross negligence, assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California’s Bane Act.

Screening and Claims Allowed to Proceed

The court conducted the required preliminary screening of a prisoner complaint. It concluded that, liberally construed, the complaint stated the following cognizable claims:

- Against Kunaboot in his individual capacity: Fourteenth Amendment claims for failure to intervene, deliberate indifference, and bodily privacy; a section 1985 conspiracy claim; negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and a Bane Act claim. - Against Mercado in his individual capacity: Fourteenth Amendment claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference; a section 1985 conspiracy claim; negligence; assault; battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and a Bane Act claim. - Against both defendants in their official capacities: claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.

The court also stated that Tamrat had identified one Doe sergeant who allegedly participated with Mercado in using excessive force or forcing him to use his legs despite severe pain. Tamrat must identify that Doe sergeant by name by the time he files his opposition to a defense dispositive motion, or the Doe sergeant will be dismissed. The court did not find that Tamrat had described ten unknown defendants as alleged by the “Does 1–10” designation.

Claim Dismissed

The court dismissed Tamrat’s section 1986 claim without prejudice. Section 1986 can impose liability on a person who knows about a section 1985 conspiracy, has the power to prevent it, and fails to do so. The court found that Tamrat had named the two people he alleged were involved in the conspiracy but had not alleged that another defendant knew about the conspiracy and failed to stop it.

Motion for Injunctive Relief

Tamrat sought injunctive relief against the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department and the Prisoner Legal Services department based on alleged denial of access to the courts. The court denied the motion. It found that Tamrat had not identified an immediate injury, that the proposed entities were not defendants in this lawsuit, and that the claims against them were not properly joined with the claims in this case. The court also found that his release from jail custody made the request for injunctive relief moot.

Motion to Stay

Tamrat asked the court to stay this case and other civil cases because he had been released from county jail and was homeless or transient. The court denied the stay because no deadlines were then pending while service was underway and defendants were preparing to respond. The court stated that Tamrat could seek an extension if he needed one for a particular filing and required him to provide his new address when he had one.

Disposition and Case Management

The court ordered the Clerk to send the complaint and service-waiver materials to Kunaboot and Mercado and to send copies to the San Francisco City Attorney and Tamrat. It directed the defendants to answer under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and established a schedule for dispositive motions, opposition briefs, and replies. It authorized discovery under the federal rules, including depositions of Tamrat and other necessary incarcerated witnesses. The order terminated Docket Nos. 15 and 19, which were the motions for injunctive relief and to stay.