Restituyo Sanchez v. Jemkay Construction Corp.

Background

Jean Carlos Restituyo Sanchez brought federal and state wage-and-hour claims against JemKay Construction Corp., EK Realty LLC, and Jacob Eisenstein. The opinion states that Sanchez was the superintendent of a building in the Bronx, New York, from May 2022 through October 2024.

From October 2022 through November 2024, the building was under the oversight of a receiver appointed by the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, in a foreclosure proceeding. That court authorized the receiver to obtain help from a property manager and appointed Eisenstein and EK Realty to serve in that role. Sanchez filed this federal lawsuit without first obtaining permission from the state court that appointed the receiver.

Barton Doctrine

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The issue was whether the Barton doctrine required Sanchez to obtain permission from the appointing court before suing Eisenstein and EK Realty.

The court held that the doctrine applies even though the foreclosure proceeding and receivership had ended and the property had been sold before Sanchez filed suit. The court followed the majority view among the authorities it considered, reasoning that the doctrine’s institutional purposes remain relevant after the underlying proceeding closes. Those purposes include protecting the appointing court’s oversight of its officers and protecting receivers from unjustified personal liability for acts within their official duties.

The court also rejected Sanchez’s argument that the doctrine applies only to the receiver personally. It held that the doctrine extends to agents and professionals appointed or hired to perform the receiver’s official duties. Because Eisenstein and EK Realty served as the receiver’s appointed property managers and agents, they fell within the doctrine’s protection.

Effect of Failing to Obtain Permission

The court disagreed with the view that the Barton doctrine is jurisdictional. In this context, “jurisdictional” would mean that the federal court lacks power to hear the case. Instead, the court held that permission from the appointing court is a condition precedent—a requirement that must be satisfied before the action proceeds against the protected parties.

The court identified three possible responses to the failure to obtain permission: allowing the action to continue subject to a later order from the appointing court; staying the action while Sanchez seeks permission after the fact; or dismissing the action without prejudice to restarting it after permission is obtained.

Disposition and Next Steps

The court did not choose among those three options. It ordered the parties to appear by telephone for a conference on June 12, 2025, to address the appropriate course and the process and timing for seeking permission from the state court.

The court specifically noted that the Barton doctrine does not extend to JemKay Construction Corp., which was never appointed as receiver, property manager, or to another position concerning the property. It also noted that some claims concern periods before the receiver, EK Realty, or Eisenstein were appointed. The clerk was directed to terminate ECF No. 13, the pending motion to dismiss. The opinion does not state that the motion was granted or denied, and it does not decide the merits of Sanchez’s wage-and-hour claims.