Mullin v. City of Mountain View, California

Background

Tyghe James Mullin is proceeding without a lawyer and without prepaying filing fees. He sued the City of Mountain View and several Mountain View Police Department officers for alleged violations of federal and state constitutional rights.

The court had previously dismissed Mullin’s first amended complaint under the screening process required for certain cases filed without prepaying fees. The court found that the earlier complaint did not provide enough facts explaining the alleged civil-rights violations, including the circumstances involving an Apple AirTag and the alleged search and seizure of property. The court allowed Mullin to amend his complaint.

Mullin’s second amended complaint says the claims arise from an alleged illegal entry, search, and seizure of his rental storage unit on March 22, 2023. He alleges that officers tracked him using Mr. Brewer’s Apple AirTag and entered the storage unit without probable cause, consent, or a valid warrant. He says the conduct led to custody for more than a year and a half, criminal charges, prosecution using allegedly illegal evidence, reputational harm, and barriers to employment and housing.

The second amended complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 involving the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability against the City, and retaliation under the First Amendment. It also asserts a due-process and access-to-courts claim, plus a claim under the California Constitution. The court noted that the complaint’s body did not identify the officers by name and assumed that the officers listed in the caption were the intended defendants: Detective Raymond Clutter, Sgt. Ricky Valenzuela, Officer Frank Edwards, Officer Daniel Miller, Officer Kevin Galloway, and Officer Ed Hammon.

Screening decision

The court found that the second amended complaint was sufficient to pass the low threshold for initial screening. The court noted that police reports attached to the complaint indicated that officers had probable cause before obtaining warrants and obtained search warrants before entering the storage unit, but Mullin disputed that account. He alleges that the officers entered and seized his property before obtaining probable cause or warrants.

The court did not decide whether Mullin’s allegations are true or whether the defendants violated his rights. It also noted that the complaint did not make clear whether Mullin had been convicted of charges arising from the alleged constitutional violations. If he was convicted, the defendants may argue that the civil-rights claims are barred by the rule requiring a conviction or sentence to have been reversed or otherwise invalidated before certain related claims may proceed. The court stated that the screening decision does not prevent the defendants from later filing a motion to dismiss on that or another ground.

Other filings and directives

The court struck Mullin’s filings at ECF 19, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37 because the court’s task at this stage was limited to screening the second amended complaint.

Because the complaint passed screening, the court determined that Mullin was entitled to have the summons and second amended complaint served without prepaying fees. The court directed the City to file a status report by June 20, 2025, stating whether service by the United States Marshals Service is necessary for any defendants. The City and all other defendants who have been served must respond to the second amended complaint by June 27, 2025. Any motion to dismiss must share a twenty-five-page limit with its reply, which is limited to fifteen pages.

Disposition

The court found the second amended complaint sufficient to pass the initial screening required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, struck the specified additional filings, and issued the service-status and response directives. The order did not resolve the merits of Mullin’s claims.