Rouviere v. Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc.

Background

Jodi Rouviere brought product-liability claims arising from complications after a 2012 hip-replacement surgery. Her husband, Andre Rouviere, brought related loss-of-consortium claims. The case originally included eight defendants, but the plaintiffs later dismissed their claims against six, leaving DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. and Howmedica Osteonics Corporation.

The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to DePuy and Howmedica and closed the case. The Second Circuit later reviewed the summary-judgment decisions without deference to the district court and unanimously affirmed, concluding that Rouviere’s claims were time-barred. Rouviere had counsel during the district-court proceedings but represented herself on appeal and in the motions addressed by this opinion.

Rule 60(b)(6) Motions

Rouviere moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), a provision allowing a court to grant relief from a final judgment or order for an exceptional reason not covered by the rule’s other grounds. She sought to vacate thirteen orders by the magistrate judge, the district judge’s summary-judgment orders, and the district judge’s ruling on her objections to the magistrate judge’s discovery orders.

Rouviere argued that the magistrate judge should have recused himself because he received fixed annual payments from Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, his former law firm, while presiding over the case. Arnold & Porter’s website identified Johnson & Johnson, DePuy’s parent company, as a company the firm had helped or advised at some point. Rouviere did not claim that the magistrate judge had worked for Johnson & Johnson or that the firm’s work for Johnson & Johnson related to this case.

She also argued, and the parties agreed, that the district judge should have recused himself because he owned and traded stock in Johnson & Johnson while handling the case. In addition, she argued in her reply brief that one judge on the Second Circuit panel may have been conflicted because the judge’s spouse received income from a law firm that represented Howmedica in a separate case. The court considered that argument after allowing the parties to file additional responses.

Rulings on the Magistrate Judge’s Orders

Judge Woods denied Rouviere’s request to vacate the magistrate judge’s rulings. Under the federal recusal statute, a judge must step aside when impartiality might reasonably be questioned or when the judge has certain financial interests connected to the case. The court held that the magistrate judge’s fixed payments from his former law firm were too remote to create a reasonable question about impartiality.

The court emphasized that Arnold & Porter was a large firm, that it was not a party in the case, and that the firm’s work for Johnson & Johnson was not shown to be related to this case. The payments were fixed by agreement and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation. The court therefore concluded that the magistrate judge was not required to recuse himself and that there was no basis to vacate his orders under Rule 60(b)(6).

Rulings on the District Judge’s Orders

Judge Woods accepted that the district judge’s ownership and transactions in Johnson & Johnson stock created a conflict requiring recusal. But he denied Rouviere’s request to vacate that judge’s rulings. The Second Circuit had already reviewed the summary-judgment decisions independently and affirmed them, holding that Rouviere’s claims against both defendants were time-barred.

Applying the factors used to decide whether a violation of the recusal statute warrants reopening a case, the court found little risk of injustice because Rouviere had already received an independent appellate review. The court also found that reopening the case would create delay and expense without a basis to conclude that another review would produce a different or fairer result. The Second Circuit’s decision was binding on the district court.

The court separately considered the district judge’s ruling on Rouviere’s objections to the magistrate judge’s discovery orders. Those rulings had not received de novo review in the Second Circuit, but Judge Woods found the risk of injustice minimal because the magistrate judge was not conflicted and the district judge had reviewed the discovery orders under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.

The court also rejected Rouviere’s argument concerning the Second Circuit judge. It held that the fact that the judge’s spouse was a partner at a firm representing Howmedica in a separate matter, without evidence that the spouse worked on Howmedica’s matter, did not itself require recusal. The court added that the agreement of two unconflicted judges on the three-judge panel was enough to establish the panel’s decision.

Evidentiary Hearing

Judge Woods denied Rouviere’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. Such hearings generally address disputed material facts. The defendants did not dispute the payments to the magistrate judge, the law firm’s connection to Johnson & Johnson, the Circuit Judge’s spouse’s connection to the law firm representing Howmedica in another case, or the district judge’s conflict. Because the material facts were undisputed, the court found no need for testimony or a hearing.

Disposition

The court denied Rouviere’s motion for vacatur and denied her motion for an evidentiary hearing. It terminated the motions at Docket Numbers 364 and 373. The court also certified that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status for that appeal.