Brinson v. State of California

Background

Brad Brinson sued the State of California, the California Highway Patrol, Officer P. Santiago, Bay Area Phlebotomy and Laboratory Services (BAPLS), and Joshua Hammack. The motion addressed only the claims against BAPLS and Hammack.

Brinson alleged that Officer Santiago arrested him for driving under the influence on August 28, 2019. After Brinson had difficulty completing a breathalyzer test, Santiago told him he would need a blood test. Brinson was taking an anticoagulant for a heart condition and told Santiago about it. According to the complaint, Santiago threatened to send him to jail and cause him to lose his driver’s license if he refused, and did not offer a urine test. Hammack, a BAPLS phlebotomist, performed the blood draw after Brinson asked whether it was safe and Hammack responded that he was not a doctor and did not know. Brinson alleged that he feared uncontrolled bleeding and suffered continuing flashbacks and panic.

Brinson asserted five claims against the lab defendants: constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment; battery against Hammack; negligence against both defendants; and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against BAPLS.

Statute of Limitations

The lab defendants argued that all claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court explained that § 1983 claims use California’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims. Brinson argued that the period was paused while his criminal case arising from the arrest was pending. His complaint only stated generally that the criminal case had been pending, while his opposition brief stated that the criminal matter was dismissed on December 30, 2021.

The court could not use facts raised for the first time in an opposition brief to decide whether the complaint survived dismissal. It therefore found the complaint’s allegation about tolling—the pausing of the limitations period—too conclusory. But the court concluded that Brinson might be able to amend the complaint to allege facts supporting tolling. It granted the motion to dismiss on this ground with leave to amend and then considered the substance of the claims conditionally, assuming Brinson could establish timeliness.

Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and conduct by a person acting under color of state law. The court found that the complaint plausibly alleged that Hammack acted under color of state law because he performed the blood draw under Santiago’s direction to collect evidence for a criminal investigation. The court also found that the allegations supported an inference that Hammack and the state were joint participants in the blood draw.

The court therefore concluded that, assuming the claims were timely, Brinson stated Fourth Amendment § 1983 claims against Hammack. For a § 1983 claim against a private entity, however, Brinson also had to allege that an official policy, custom, or pattern of the entity caused the constitutional injury. The complaint alleged only that BAPLS should have provided adequate training and supervision. Because it did not allege BAPLS policies or explain how they caused the injury, the court dismissed the § 1983 claims against BAPLS with leave to amend.

Battery

The court rejected the argument that California’s implied-consent law defeated Brinson’s battery claim. Although the law may imply consent to chemical testing after a driving-under-the-influence arrest, the court held that it did not necessarily imply consent to a blood draw when other testing options were available. The court also declined to dismiss the battery claim based on Brinson’s request for punitive damages.

Assuming Brinson could amend to address timeliness, the court found that he had adequately pleaded a battery claim against Hammack.

Negligence

The court found that Brinson plausibly alleged that Hammack breached a duty of care by performing a blood draw despite the warning that a person taking an anticoagulant should not have blood drawn and despite Hammack’s statement that he did not know whether the procedure was safe. The court also found that the alleged physical intrusion from the needle could support recovery for emotional injury associated with the blood draw. Assuming timeliness, Brinson had adequately pleaded negligence against Hammack.

The court stated that BAPLS could be vicariously liable for Hammack’s negligence if a negligence claim against him was established, and noted that the lab defendants did not dispute that point.

Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

The court dismissed Brinson’s claim that BAPLS negligently hired, supervised, or retained Hammack. The complaint contained only a conclusory allegation that BAPLS should have provided adequate training and supervision. The court found those allegations conclusory and speculative and dismissed the claim with leave to amend.

Disposition

The court granted the lab defendants’ motion to dismiss. Brinson was granted leave to amend to allege facts supporting tolling of the statute of limitations, amend his § 1983 claims against BAPLS, and amend his negligent hiring claim against BAPLS. The court ordered him to file a second amended complaint by July 7, 2025. The opinion does not state that any dismissal was with or without prejudice.