Cawthon v. Yaoyage
- Tarnofsky
- 1:22-cv-07279
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 2
In Cawthon v. Yaoyage, Judge Tarnofsky ordered Cawthon to address personal jurisdiction before deciding his default-judgment motion.
Scott Cawthon must address personal jurisdiction and provide the counter-notice supporting his request for default judgment against Yaoyage. The order leaves the jurisdiction issue and default-judgment motion unresolved.
What happened
In Cawthon v. Yaoyage, Scott Cawthon asked the court to enter judgment because Yaoyage had not defended against his Copyright Act claims.
The court said it must first determine whether it has personal jurisdiction—legal authority over the defendant—before granting default judgment. Cawthon argued that Yaoyage consented to jurisdiction in this District by submitting a counter-notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. But earlier correspondence indicated that the counter-notice did not include that consent, and the court had reached a similar conclusion in a prior related proceeding brought by Cawthon.
The court did not decide whether it has jurisdiction or whether to grant default judgment. Instead, Judge Robyn F. Tarnofsky ordered Cawthon to file, by June 24, 2025, a memorandum addressing personal jurisdiction and to attach the counter-notice on which he relied.
The detailed version
- Cawthon v. Yaoyage · No. 1:22-cv-07279
- Tarnofsky
- June 17, 2025
Background
Scott Cawthon moved for default judgment against Yaoyage on claims under the Copyright Act. A default judgment is a judgment requested because the opposing party did not defend the case. Judge Jennifer H. Rearden referred the motion to United States Magistrate Judge Robyn F. Tarnofsky for disposition.
Jurisdiction issue
Before granting default judgment, the court may first ensure that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, meaning legal authority over that defendant. Cawthon argued that the court had personal jurisdiction over Yaoyage, whom the opinion describes as a resident of China, under Section 512(g)(3)(D) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Cawthon relied on a counter-notice that he said consented to jurisdiction in any judicial district where Amazon could be found, including the Southern District of New York.
The opinion notes, however, that Cawthon had previously filed correspondence from Amazon identifying deficiencies in Yaoyage's counter-notice. That correspondence indicated that Yaoyage had not consented to jurisdiction in every district where Amazon could be found. The court also noted that, in a prior related proceeding brought by Cawthon involving nearly identical facts, the court concluded that Cawthon had not established that the counter-notice was effective under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act so as to constitute consent to jurisdiction.
Order
The court did not rule on personal jurisdiction and did not decide the default-judgment motion. Judge Tarnofsky ordered Cawthon to file a memorandum by June 24, 2025, addressing whether the court has personal jurisdiction over Yaoyage. The court also ordered him to attach as an exhibit the counter-notice on which he relied.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.