McGee v. Oakland Police Department

Background

Anthony S. McGee, a former federal prisoner who was on supervised release, filed a pro se Third Amended Complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He proceeded without a lawyer and was allowed to proceed without paying the filing fee. He sued numerous local police departments, sheriff’s offices, state and federal agencies, and officials concerning enforcement or facilitation of his sex-offender registration requirement under California Penal Code section 290.

McGee was adjudicated as a juvenile in 1994 for committing lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under 14. He was sent to the California Youth Authority and paroled in November 2000. The sentencing court ordered him to register as a sex offender. McGee argued that, under the law in effect when he was adjudicated, his registration obligation ended when he turned 25 on March 30, 2002.

The court reviewed McGee’s earlier related criminal proceedings, in which the court had determined that California law required him to register for 10 years after his release from the California Youth Authority, with the registration period paused during later incarceration. Because McGee spent more than 16 years incarcerated as an adult, the court determined that the registration period extended until at least November 20, 2026.

McGee’s claims

McGee claimed that defendants violated his federal due-process rights by continuing to require him to register after March 30, 2002. He also claimed that defendants violated due process by failing to destroy all records relating to his registration after he turned 25.

Court’s analysis

The court rejected McGee’s argument that the California statute did not cover people released from the California Youth Authority. It concluded that the reference in California Penal Code section 290.008 to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation included the California Youth Authority or its equivalent, the Division of Juvenile Justice.

The court also held that the tolling provision in section 290 applied to a registration obligation arising under section 290.008. That provision pauses the required registration period during later incarceration, placement, or commitment. Applying that rule, the court concluded that McGee’s registration obligation had not ended when he turned 25 and continued until at least November 20, 2026.

The court further concluded that current California law no longer required automatic destruction of registration records when a person turned 25. Instead, the law allowed destruction of the records if the person’s records were sealed under the applicable state-law procedures. The court rejected McGee’s related constitutional arguments.

Disposition

Judge Breyer dismissed the Third Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court ordered that no further opportunity to amend was appropriate, instructed the clerk to close the case, and terminated all pending motions as moot.