Stringer v. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC

Background

Vickie M. Stringer, proceeding without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint against Simon & Schuster, Inc. The amended complaint asserted copyright infringement, breach of contract, fraudulent accounting, and unjust enrichment based on the use and distribution of a series of books she wrote. The order addressed three motions: a request for a temporary restraining order, a motion to compel production of a contract concerning Dirty Red, and a motion to strike Simon & Schuster’s answer and affirmative defenses.

Temporary restraining order

The court denied the temporary restraining order without prejudice. To obtain this emergency relief, Stringer had to show, among other things, likely irreparable harm—harm that is actual and imminent and cannot be remedied by money damages. The court found that her motion made only general assertions about economic, reputational, and brand-related harm, without facts or legal authority supporting those assertions. She also did not explain why money damages would be inadequate, particularly for economic harm.

The court additionally noted that Stringer waited more than four months after starting the case to seek emergency relief and did not explain the delay. Because she failed to sufficiently show irreparable harm, the court did not address the other requirements for an injunction, including likely success on the claims, the balance of equities, and the public interest.

Motion to compel

The court denied the motion to compel without prejudice. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) generally bars a party from seeking discovery before the parties complete the required initial discovery steps, including their Rule 26(f) conference, unless an exception applies. The court found that the parties apparently had not held that conference or exchanged initial disclosures, and no exception applied. The motion was therefore premature.

The court also found that Stringer had not followed the court’s discovery-dispute procedure. She had not shown that she made the required good-faith effort to meet and confer with Simon & Schuster in person or by telephone, and she did not file the required joint letter. The court noted that documents attached to Simon & Schuster’s materials might also have made the request moot, but it did not resolve that issue.

Motion to strike

The court denied the motion to strike. Stringer argued that Simon & Schuster’s answer contained misrepresentations and unsupported or contradictory affirmative defenses. The court observed that the answer had no exhibits, and Stringer did not argue that the answer contained redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material. The court therefore treated the motion as challenging the sufficiency of the affirmative defenses.

Under the governing standard, a defense may be stricken when no possible facts could support it, no legal theory could make it successful, or its inclusion would prejudice the opposing party. The court found that Stringer had not shown prejudice. It also explained that a motion to strike is not a vehicle for deciding disputed legal questions or requiring a party to present all of its evidence when it pleads its defenses. Stringer could use discovery to assess and challenge Simon & Schuster’s evidence and arguments later.

Other ruling

The court directed the clerk to terminate the three motions. It also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status. The order did not decide the merits of Stringer’s underlying claims.