McCaffrey v. City of Richmond

Background

Jesse McCaffrey filed the case without a lawyer. He alleged that the defendants towed and impounded his 1991 Ford E-350 van on April 10, 2024, because its registration had expired. McCaffrey alleged that he had been living in the van, that he received no notice before the tow, and that he requested a tow hearing but was not given one. He also alleged that Certified Towing, Inc. placed a lien on the van and that some personal belongings were scattered or removed.

The Second Amended Complaint asserted ten causes of action. The City Defendants—the City of Richmond, the Richmond Police Department, City Manager Shasa Curl, and Police Chief Bisa French—moved to dismiss the complaint in full or to dismiss the claims against them. McCaffrey separately moved to stay the case because his circumstances as an unhoused person made it difficult to prosecute the case without a lawyer.

Motion to Strike

The City Defendants argued that the court should strike the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) because it exceeded the scope of the state court’s permission to amend and was filed two days late. The court declined to strike the complaint on those grounds.

Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 allows a person to seek damages for an alleged violation of a federal constitutional right by someone acting under state law. For a claim against a municipality under the rule from Monell v. Department of Social Services, a plaintiff must allege an injury caused by an officially adopted policy, a longstanding practice or custom, or a final policymaker’s decision.

The court concluded that McCaffrey had not adequately alleged an official policy or a final policymaker’s decision. However, it held that he adequately alleged a longstanding practice or custom. His complaint described an alleged practice by the City and Certified Towing of seizing vehicles without notice, a warrant, or consent and of failing to provide a tow hearing or information about one. Construing his self-represented complaint liberally, the court found those allegations sufficient to state a municipal-liability claim.

Count One: Unreasonable Seizure

McCaffrey alleged that the warrantless tow violated the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that California law permits an officer to remove a vehicle found on a highway, public land, or an off-street parking facility when its registration has been expired for more than six months. Because the van was unregistered and the court concluded that the defect could not be cured, it dismissed Count One with prejudice.

Count Two: Due Process

McCaffrey alleged that the defendants violated due process by failing to provide notice of the impoundment and a hearing under California Vehicle Code section 22852. The City Defendants argued that the law did not require advance notice and relied on evidence concerning the police department’s usual practices. The court noted that the statute requires notice within 48 hours after storage and provides an opportunity for a post-storage hearing. Because McCaffrey alleged that he received no notice and was not given a hearing despite requesting one, and because the City Defendants provided no evidence that notice had been mailed to him, the court held that he stated a due-process claim. The court denied the Motion to Dismiss as to Count Two.

Count Three: Takings

McCaffrey alleged that the defendants took his property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court held that he could not allege that the van was taken for public use because vehicle towing under the cited California law falls within a municipality’s police powers. It dismissed Count Three with prejudice.

Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine: State-Law Claims

The court dismissed the claims for negligent training and supervision, fraud or negligence per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the City Defendants with leave to amend.

For negligent training and supervision, the court found that McCaffrey had not identified a statutory basis for imposing liability on the City or the Richmond Police Department. It also found that he had not adequately alleged that Curl or French hired or supervised an employee who harmed him or knew, or should have known, of a relevant risk.

For fraud or negligence per se, the court found that McCaffrey had not adequately alleged that the two unidentified defendants knew they were misleading him or intended to deceive him. The court also stated that California does not recognize negligence per se as an independent cause of action. It explained that an ordinary-negligence claim would require allegations of duty, breach, causation, and damages.

For intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found that McCaffrey had not alleged conduct extreme and outrageous enough to support the claim, or the required intent or reckless disregard by the unidentified defendants. The court allowed amendment because it was unclear whether the defects in these state-law claims could be cured.

Motion to Stay and Disposition

The court denied McCaffrey’s Motion to Stay. Instead, it provided 60 days from the order’s filing date to submit a third amended complaint and referred him to the court’s Legal Help Desk for basic legal assistance, not representation.

The court’s final disposition was: the Motion to Dismiss was granted in part and denied in part; Counts One and Three were dismissed with prejudice; Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine were dismissed with leave to amend; and Count Two against the City Defendants survived. The Motion to Stay was denied. Any third amended complaint was due by August 22, 2025.