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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled June 23, 2025

eShares, Inc. v. Talton, III

Judge
Clarke
Docket
1:22-cv-10987
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
5
DiscoveryCivil ProcedureEmployment
In one sentence

In eSHARES v. Talton, Judge Clarke denied reconsideration of message discovery but granted in part reconsideration of discrimination-complaint discovery.

Who this affects

The order directly affects eSHARES, Inc. d/b/a Carta, Inc. and Jerry O. Talton, III by determining the scope of discovery between them.

What happened

In eSHARES, Inc. v. Talton, III, Carta asked the court to reconsider discovery about Jerry O. Talton, III’s personal messages and discrimination complaints against Carta. The dispute arose from Talton’s defamation and employment-retaliation claims.

The court found Carta’s request for all messages containing racist or sexist language too broad because the alleged defamatory statement concerned whether Talton’s conduct made him unemployable. The court also found no legal support for treating those personal messages as evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty. But it found some discrimination complaints relevant to Talton’s retaliation claim.

Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke denied reconsideration concerning Talton’s racist and sexist messages. She granted in part the request concerning discrimination complaints, limiting production to sex- or sexual-orientation-based discrimination complaints against Carta from September 17, 2018, through January 20, 2024, and excluding race-based complaints.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
eShares, Inc. v. Talton, III · No. 1:22-cv-10987
Judge
Clarke
Date
June 23, 2025

Background

Carta moved for reconsideration of discovery concerning two categories of information: Jerry O. Talton, III’s personal communications containing racist or sexist messages, and discrimination complaints made against Carta. The court had already ruled on a separate reconsideration request involving retaliation complaints.

Talton’s claims include a defamation claim concerning a Medium post that allegedly portrayed him as unemployable partly because of racist and sexist behavior. The opinion also discusses Talton’s employment-retaliation claim. The court stated that Talton would need to show protected activity, the employer’s awareness of that activity, a materially harmful employment action, and a connection between the protected activity and that action.

Personal messages

The court denied Carta’s motion for reconsideration concerning production of Talton’s communications containing racist or sexist messages. It held that Carta’s request for all such communications was overbroad. The court explained that the relevant issue in Carta’s possible substantial-truth defense was whether the alleged conduct had the “gist” or “sting” of making Talton unemployable—not whether Talton had ever used racist or sexist language.

The court emphasized that the Medium post was written and distributed for employers and concerned employees. It reasoned that Carta could not show that private conduct made Talton unemployable if Carta did not know about that conduct when it fired him. The court also found that the cases Carta cited did not authorize a broad search through Talton’s personal messages. In addition, Carta had not provided a legal standard or supporting case law showing that offensive personal messages constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.

Discrimination complaints

The court granted in part Carta’s motion for reconsideration concerning discrimination complaints. It ordered Carta to produce complaints of discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation made against Carta between September 17, 2018, and January 20, 2024.

The court found this information relevant to Talton’s retaliation claim. For example, evidence that Carta treated other employees differently after similar conduct could support Talton’s argument that Carta’s stated reason for firing him was a pretext, meaning an untrue explanation covering the real reason. Complaints by other employees about sex- or sexual-orientation-based discrimination, and Carta’s responses to those complaints, could also bear on whether Talton was retaliated against.

The court excluded race-based discrimination complaints. Talton had not alleged that he complained about race-based discrimination and was retaliated against for doing so. The fact that the Medium post described Talton as racist was not enough to justify broader discovery into race-based complaints.

Disposition

Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke denied the motion for reconsideration concerning production of Talton’s racist and sexist messages. She granted in part the motion concerning production of discrimination complaints and limited that production to sex- or sexual-orientation-based complaints against Carta during the specified period.

The authoritative version

Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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