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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled June 23, 2025

Navarro-Carillo v. Banks

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
2:23-cv-04773
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
6
Summary JudgmentCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Navarro-Carillo v. Banks, Judge Swain denied both summary-judgment motions without prejudice and sent the transportation dispute back to the hearing officer for clarification.

Who this affects

Maria Navarro-Carillo and M.G., who sought payment of M.G.’s 2022–2023 school transportation costs, and the New York City Department of Education, whose payment obligation remains to be clarified by the impartial hearing officer.

What happened

Maria Navarro-Carillo sued the New York City Department of Education and David C. Banks, in his official capacity, over transportation funding for her child M.G. under an administrative order issued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The order required payment for M.G.’s transportation to and from school, but the parties disagreed about what that language covered.

The Department argued that it owed payment only for transportation M.G. actually used. Navarro-Carillo argued that it owed all charges under her transportation contract, which imposed monthly fees based on school days whether M.G. used the service each day or not. The court found both interpretations plausible and concluded that the administrative order needed clarification.

Judge Laura Swain denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment without prejudice and sent the dispute back to the hearing officer for further proceedings. The court stayed the case pending those proceedings and required periodic joint status reports.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Navarro-Carillo v. Banks · No. 2:23-cv-04773
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
June 23, 2025

Background

Maria Navarro-Carillo brought the case for herself and her minor child, M.G., against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) and David C. Banks in his official capacity as DOE Chancellor. The dispute concerned the DOE’s obligation to pay M.G.’s transportation costs for the 2022–2023 school year under an unappealed decision by an impartial hearing officer (IHO) in proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

M.G. was classified as a student with a disability under the IDEA. On April 27, 2023, IHO Michael Lazan found that the DOE had denied M.G. a free appropriate public education, that iBrain was an appropriate placement, and that the parents were entitled to relief. The IHO ordered the DOE to pay iBrain tuition, related services, and “the cost of transportation to and from school.” Neither party appealed that decision.

The transportation contract between Navarro-Carillo and Sisters Travel and Transportation Services charged fixed monthly fees based on the number of school days, regardless of whether M.G. actually used the service on a particular day. The DOE had not funded the transportation costs. It argued that payment was not required until Navarro-Carillo provided plausible proof that M.G. had specifically used transportation to and from iBrain. Navarro-Carillo sought repayment of all costs incurred under the contract.

Parties’ Motions and the Court’s Analysis

The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. In an IDEA case, a summary-judgment motion generally functions as a review of the administrative decision rather than as an ordinary trial on undisputed facts. The court explained that it could remand the matter to the administrative decision-maker when further clarification or educational expertise was needed.

The court found that the IHO’s phrase “the cost of transportation to and from school” had two plausible meanings. The DOE read it as covering only transportation actually used to take M.G. to and from iBrain. Navarro-Carillo read it as covering all costs under the transportation contract, including monthly charges imposed regardless of daily use. The court stated that other judges in the district had also found this language required clarification and that it was not aware of a case in the circuit finding Navarro-Carillo’s interpretation to be unambiguously correct.

Ruling and Disposition

The court held that the ambiguity in the IHO’s decision required a remand for further clarification. It denied without prejudice both motions for summary judgment and remanded the case to IHO Lazan for further proceedings consistent with the memorandum order. The court stayed the case and directed the Clerk of Court to place it on the suspense calendar while the administrative proceedings continued. The parties were ordered to file joint status reports on the specified schedule or within 14 days after the administrative action ended, whichever occurred earlier.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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