Nelson v. Center for Reproductive Medicine & Advanced Reproductive Technologies

Background

Damien Lashaun Nelson, who was proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that he sought in-vitro fertilization services from Center for Reproductive Medicine and Advanced Reproductive Technologies, which the court collectively called “CRM,” while he was incarcerated. Nelson said he intended to have additional children through gestational carriers and other partners. He alleged that his religious beliefs as a practicing Islamic Muslim prohibited him from discarding sperm and that CRM initially agreed to provide services, but later stopped because of a policy against working with incarcerated people.

Nelson alleged discrimination based on his incarceration and religion. He also asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and hostile environment. He sought damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

Claims Against Particular Defendants

The court dismissed all claims against Joshua Kapfhamer and Attorney Advisors because Nelson’s allegations referred to the defendants collectively and did not explain who did what. Nelson alleged only that Kapfhamer was a CRM employee involved in his case. He described Attorney Advisors as CRM’s legal representatives who provided guidance about policy changes, but did not identify conduct by them beyond serving as legal counsel.

The court treated Nelson’s claims against CRM as adequately directed to CRM for purposes of reviewing the claims because CRM was the alleged contracting party and the entity with the challenged policy.

Reasons for Dismissal

For breach of contract, the court held that Nelson did not plausibly allege formation of a contract. He alleged that the defendants agreed to provide IVF services and that signed documents and correspondence confirmed the agreement, but he did not identify the services CRM was supposed to provide or what he was supposed to pay. A letter that Nelson submitted also referred only to a requested medical visit and an agreement to provide services, without defining the services or other material terms.

The court dismissed the good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim because that duty arises from a valid contract, and the court had found that Nelson did not plausibly allege one.

The court dismissed the religious-discrimination claim because Nelson did not identify a specific law supporting it. The court explained that the federal laws Nelson appeared to invoke applied to employers or the government, while CRM was neither Nelson’s employer nor a state actor. The court also stated that Minnesota law did not provide protection from religious discrimination in this business context and that Nelson had not explained how CRM’s practices violated his religious belief about discarding sperm.

The intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim failed because stopping services, even if wrongful or based on a policy against serving incarcerated people, was not conduct so extreme and outrageous that it was intolerable to the civilized community. The court also found that Nelson’s general allegation of significant emotional distress was insufficient. His negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim failed because he did not allege that he was in physical danger, feared for his safety, or suffered physical manifestations of emotional distress.

The hostile-environment claim failed because Nelson did not identify a specific legal basis, and the court found that hostile-environment claims were limited to contexts such as employment and education that did not apply here. Nelson also did not provide details explaining how CRM affected his environment while he was incarcerated.

The court further rejected Nelson’s apparent claim that he was discriminated against because of his incarcerated status, stating that incarceration is not a protected category under the laws discussed. Any constitutional discrimination claim also failed because CRM was not a state actor. Finally, the court rejected Nelson’s request for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because he was proceeding without a lawyer and therefore had no attorney’s fees to pay.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed Nelson’s claims with prejudice, meaning the claims could not be refiled in that action. The court denied as moot Nelson’s two motions contesting the motion to dismiss and denied as moot his requests for discovery and a scheduling order. Judgment was ordered to be entered. Donovan W. Frank signed the order as United States District Judge.