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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled June 30, 2025

Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser

Judge
Lin
Docket
3:25-cv-05436
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
4
ImmigrationCivil ProcedurePreliminary Injunction
In one sentence

In Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, Judge Lin temporarily barred immigration officials from re-arresting Guillermo M.R. pending a preliminary-injunction hearing.

Who this affects

Guillermo M.R. was temporarily protected from re-arrest and re-detention by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the respondents and persons acting on their behalf. The order also required the respondents to respond to the motion and appear at a hearing.

What happened

In Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, Guillermo M.R. asked the court to stop the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement from re-arresting him. He said he had been released on bond in March 2023 and was scheduled to be detained on July 1, 2025.

The court found serious questions about whether the process available after re-arrest would satisfy constitutional due-process requirements. It also found that the balance of harms favored Guillermo M.R., noting that the government waited more than six weeks after the incident at issue before seeking to arrest him.

Judge Rita F. Lin granted the request for a temporary restraining order to preserve the existing situation. The order bars the respondents from re-arresting or re-detaining Guillermo M.R. until July 14, 2025, at 5:00 p.m., and requires them to explain at a July 14 hearing why a preliminary injunction should not issue.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser · No. 3:25-cv-05436
Judge
Lin
Date
June 30, 2025

Background

Guillermo M.R. filed an emergency request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He sought to prevent the respondents from re-arresting and re-detaining him. He asserted that he had been released on bond in March 2023 and that the respondents planned to detain him on July 1, 2025, at 8:00 a.m.

The court held an emergency hearing on June 30, 2025. Counsel for both sides appeared. Before the hearing, the court reviewed the petition, the motion, and materials filed by the respondents. The court incorporated the reasoning stated during the hearing into its written order.

Court’s reasoning

The court concluded that the authorities cited by the respondents did not change its determination. It distinguished Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland because that case involved a different detention provision, Section 1226(a), which provides substantial procedural protections, while 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) provides no right to a bond hearing. The court also noted that Rodriguez Diaz involved people already in detention, whereas Guillermo M.R. had spent more than two years released on bond. The court found a serious question about whether re-arresting him while providing more limited process would satisfy constitutional due-process requirements.

The court also distinguished Uc v. Kaiser. In that case, the petitioner’s liberty interests had been diminished after the Board of Immigration Appeals overturned the immigration judge’s bond-release order. Here, according to the court, the government had not appealed Guillermo M.R.’s original bond decision. The court observed that Uc had distinguished re-arrests that did not challenge the initial detention or bond decision.

The respondents argued that regulations would provide Guillermo M.R. an opportunity to challenge his detention after re-arrest. The court found that the cited procedures did not appear to provide a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker and did not specify when the initial review would occur. The respondents had not identified another way for Guillermo M.R. to challenge his detention or bond revocation in the near future.

The court further found that the balance of equities favored Guillermo M.R. The respondents had waited more than six weeks after the incident at issue before trying to arrest him, and they had given him advance notice through an appointment. The respondents’ counsel acknowledged that ICE likely could have obtained the police report when it learned of the arrest in mid-May. The court viewed the respondents’ conduct as showing a lack of urgency.

Order

The court granted Guillermo M.R.’s motion for a temporary restraining order to preserve the existing situation while the parties briefed the request and prepared for a hearing. The respondents and persons acting on their behalf were enjoined and restrained from re-arresting or re-detaining Guillermo M.R. until July 14, 2025, at 5:00 p.m.

The respondents were ordered to appear at an in-person hearing on July 14, 2025, at 1:00 p.m., and show why a preliminary injunction should not issue. They were required to respond to the motion by July 7, 2025, and Guillermo M.R. could reply by July 10, 2025. The court required service of the order and related filings by July 2, 2025, and stated that no security bond was required. The order did not decide whether a preliminary injunction would ultimately issue.

The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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