Gakuba v. James

Background

Peter Gakuba, who was representing himself, brought claims against Letitia James, Merrick Garland, and Kwame Raoul in both their individual and official capacities. The complaint invoked the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, as the court understood the claims against Garland, the constitutional cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Gakuba sought damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief based on the alleged use of his New York driver’s-license information and video-rental information during his Illinois state-court criminal prosecution.

The court noted that Gakuba had previously been convicted in Illinois of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse and sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison. The court also discussed a prior related proceeding in which a federal court had identified deficiencies in similar Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, Video Privacy Protection Act, § 1983, and Bivens claims. That earlier proceeding was later dismissed without prejudice at Gakuba’s request, making the earlier recommendation moot.

Court’s Analysis

Because Gakuba had been allowed to proceed without paying filing fees in advance, the court was required to screen the complaint. It had to dismiss claims that were frivolous or malicious, failed to state a claim for relief, sought money from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court was required to read a self-represented litigant’s allegations liberally, but the complaint still had to provide enough facts to make a legally plausible claim.

For Gakuba’s individual-capacity claims under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, Video Privacy Protection Act, § 1983, and Bivens, the court dismissed for failure to state a claim, relying on the reasons identified in the earlier related proceeding. Those reasons included the earlier court’s conclusion that the alleged use of driver-record information by law enforcement during a criminal investigation was a permitted use under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act; that Gakuba had not alleged that any defendant was a video-tape service provider as required for a Video Privacy Protection Act claim; and that the defendants were not personally involved in the 2006 criminal investigation because they had not yet held their current positions.

The court also dismissed Gakuba’s official-capacity damages claims for the reasons identified in the earlier related proceeding, including Eleventh Amendment immunity for James and Raoul and federal sovereign immunity for Garland. The Eleventh Amendment is a constitutional protection that generally prevents suits against states and certain state officials in federal court. The court separately dismissed Gakuba’s official-capacity claims for injunctive and retrospective declaratory relief under § 1983 against James and Raoul for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The court understood the official-capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Garland as requests for an order requiring a federal official to perform a duty. It dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim because Gakuba had not alleged facts showing a clear right to the requested relief, a plainly defined duty the federal government had to perform, or the absence of another adequate remedy. The court also noted that claims challenging the fact or length of Gakuba’s Illinois conviction and sentence must be brought through a different type of federal proceeding and in the appropriate federal appellate court, rather than through this § 1983 action.

Recusal Motions and Amendment

Gakuba filed two requests asking Judge Swain to step aside. The court denied both. It found that the requests appeared to be based on the delay in issuing a substantive order and the court’s failure to grant the relief Gakuba wanted. The court stated that Gakuba had not shown personal bias or prejudice and that adverse judicial rulings ordinarily do not establish a basis for recusal.

The court declined to give Gakuba permission to amend the complaint because it found that the defects in the complaint and supplement could not be cured by amendment.

Disposition

The court dismissed the action. It denied Gakuba’s motions for recusal and disqualification, granted his motion for permission to file electronically, and treated his motion to supplement the complaint as a supplement. It denied all other remaining motions, applications, and requests as moot and directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motions. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, denied fee-free status for an appeal, and directed the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the action. The court did not address Gakuba’s petition styled for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.