Slaten v. Christian Dior Perfumes, LLC.

Background

Alexis Slaten alleged that Christian Dior Perfumes, LLC deceptively labeled and advertised the duration of the sun-protection factor, or SPF, for its Forever Foundation and Forever Skin Glow Foundation products. She alleged that the front labels created the false impression that the products provided SPF 15 protection for 24 hours.

In March 2023, the court denied Dior’s first motion to dismiss, finding that Slaten had plausibly alleged that reasonable consumers were likely to be deceived by the products’ front label. The court allowed Slaten to amend claims based on products she had not purchased because she had not established her legal standing to bring those class claims. After later motions to dismiss, the court interpreted the Ninth Circuit’s decision in McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co. to require consideration of a product’s back label when its front label could have multiple meanings, some nondeceptive. After reviewing the back label, the court dismissed Slaten’s claims and entered judgment for Dior.

Motion for reconsideration

After Slaten appealed, the Ninth Circuit decided Whiteside v. Kimberly Clark Corp. Whiteside clarified that a front label is not ambiguous in a California false-advertising case merely because it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. At the pleading stage, a plaintiff may proceed if she plausibly alleges that a reasonable consumer would view the front label as having one unambiguous and deceptive meaning. The back label may be considered at the dismissal stage only when reasonable consumers would necessarily need more information before concluding that the front label makes a particular representation.

Slaten moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), a provision allowing relief from a judgment for extraordinary reasons, and sought an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1. The court previously concluded that the factors identified in Phelps v. Alameida favored reconsideration because its dismissal had been based on an interpretation of McGinity that Whiteside later clarified was incorrect.

The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to rule on Slaten’s reconsideration motion. The parties submitted supplemental briefing. Dior argued that the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished memorandum decision in Bryan v. Del Monte Foods, Inc. contradicted the court’s earlier conclusion.

Analysis

The court did not repeat its earlier analysis. It reaffirmed that the Phelps factors favored reconsideration, particularly because Whiteside clarified that the court’s interpretation of McGinity was wrong. The court then considered whether Bryan required a different result and concluded that it did not.

In Bryan, the Ninth Circuit held that a fruit-cup label using the phrase “fruit natural” was not plausibly alleged to be unambiguously deceptive to an ordinary consumer. The context suggested that “naturals” might be the product’s name and that the fruit could be natural even if the syrup was not. Because consumers would need more information to determine the label’s specific representation, the back label could be considered.

The court found the Dior products different. It concluded that reasonable consumers would not necessarily need additional information before reasonably concluding from the front label that Dior represented the products’ sunscreen protection would last 24 hours. The court therefore held that Bryan did not require any change to its earlier indicative ruling.

Disposition

The court granted Slaten’s motion for reconsideration. The opinion does not expressly state whether the prior judgment was vacated, reinstate particular claims, or set a schedule for further proceedings.