Velez v. Lasko Products, LLC

Background

Juan Velez bought a low-profile portable baseboard space heater made by Lasko Products, LLC, in October 2021. He brought a proposed class action alleging that the heater had defects and that Lasko’s statements about its automatic temperature-control feature were misleading. His amended complaint asserted claims under New York General Business Law sections 349 and 350, consumer-fraud laws of nine other states, warranty laws, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, common-law fraud, and unjust enrichment.

The court had previously dismissed all claims except the New York General Business Law claims and the claims under the nine other states’ consumer-fraud statutes. After discovery, Lasko moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence leaves any genuine factual dispute for a trial. Lasko also alternatively asked the court to exclude the opinions of Velez’s proposed experts.

Velez used the heater in his sons’ basement-room apartment. He said the room became extremely hot overnight and believed the heater did not shut off at the set temperature. But he did not measure the room’s temperature, did not observe whether the heater turned off and back on, and did not later experience another incident in which the heater exceeded its displayed setting. The record also showed that he never contacted Lasko customer service, never considered using the warranty, and did not rely on Lasko advertising or packaging when deciding to buy the product.

Claims and Analysis

Velez withdrew his claims under the consumer-fraud statutes of Alabama, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, West Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah. The court therefore dismissed those multistate consumer-protection claims. It analyzed the remaining New York General Business Law sections 349 and 350 claims together because the applicable recovery standards are otherwise the same.

The court held that both New York claims require proof of actual injury. Velez primarily relied on a price-premium theory: he argued that misleading statements caused him to pay more for the heater than he otherwise would have paid. But his proposed expert, Dr. Ingersoll, had not conducted a price-premium analysis. The expert report only described a proposed future consumer survey and other methods. The court concluded that this proposal was not admissible evidence establishing a price premium and that no reasonable factfinder could find injury on that theory.

Velez also argued in his opposition brief that he relied on Lasko’s promises and did not receive the benefit of his bargain. The court rejected that theory because the undisputed evidence showed that he did not view or rely on Lasko’s advertising or product packaging when making his purchase. He bought the heater because he was familiar with the Lasko brand.

The court further rejected Velez’s argument that statutory damages themselves could establish injury. It explained that the availability of statutory damages does not eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff prove actual injury before recovering under sections 349 or 350. Because Velez failed to provide evidence of actual injury, the court did not decide whether the heater was defective or whether Lasko’s statements were misleading. It also did not reach the related requests to exclude expert testimony about defects and customer confusion.

Disposition

Judge Jennifer L. Rochon granted Lasko’s motion for summary judgment. The court denied Lasko’s Daubert motion to exclude expert opinions as moot. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion and close the case. The opinion does not state that either disposition was with or without prejudice.