Jama v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company

Background

Asli Jama was driving her employer’s minivan and parked it across the street from a market in Minneapolis. After shopping, she crossed the street toward the minivan and was struck by a hit-and-run vehicle. She suffered a broken foot and bruising. Jama sought a declaration that the injuries were covered by the employer’s uninsured and underinsured motorist policy issued by Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company.

The policy covered an “insured,” including anyone “occupying” the covered minivan. The policy defined “occupying” as being “in, upon, getting in, on, out or off” the vehicle. The parties agreed that the hit-and-run driver qualified as an uninsured or underinsured motorist.

Legal Issue

Berkshire Hathaway moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to decide a case without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Berkshire Hathaway argued that Jama was not an insured because she did not occupy the minivan when she was struck.

Jama argued that Minnesota’s no-fault insurance statute, rather than the policy’s definition, controlled. The court rejected that argument. It explained that the statute applies to insureds as defined by the relevant policy and does not change who qualifies as an insured under that policy. The court therefore applied the policy’s definition of “occupying.”

Court’s Analysis

The court concluded that the ordinary meaning of “occupying” does not cover someone who is merely near a vehicle without being in the act of getting into or out of it. The court relied on Minnesota decisions holding that people standing near an employer’s vehicle, or crossing a street to reach a vehicle, did not occupy that vehicle.

The court considered Jama’s testimony that she was near, close to, or trying to open the minivan’s door. It also considered an eyewitness’s statement that Jama was crossing the street with groceries, was not getting into a vehicle, and was hit in the middle of the street. Affidavits from first responders, a police report, and photographs from a responding officer’s body-worn camera likewise placed Jama in the middle of the road and showed that the minivan was some distance away.

Although Jama gave conflicting accounts of where she was and what she was doing, the court found that her accounts were contradicted by the other evidence and by portions of her own testimony. It concluded that no reasonable juror could reject the photographic evidence and the consistent accounts of the eyewitness, police officer, and medical responder in favor of Jama’s conflicting recollection. The court therefore found no genuine dispute of material fact.

Disposition

The court ruled that Jama was not occupying the minivan when the hit-and-run vehicle struck her and therefore was not an insured under the policy. Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan granted Berkshire Hathaway’s motion for summary judgment. The order also states that Jama’s claims were dismissed with prejudice and directed that judgment be entered.