Wasserman v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Julianna Wasserman, a preschool teacher at Public School 290, sued the New York City Department of Education over events involving knee injuries, medical leave, and surgery. She asserted four claims: interference with rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, retaliation under that law, discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law, and retaliation under that law.

According to the amended complaint, Wasserman injured her knee in April 2022. While she was away from work, the school’s principal allegedly discouraged her from taking more time off and, through an assistant, warned that she might not be asked back the following year. Wasserman returned to work before the end of the school year, despite difficulty moving around.

Wasserman injured the same knee again in October 2022 and later learned that she needed surgery. In January and February 2023, she allegedly notified school administrators that she needed medical leave. She claimed that the principal and assistant principal responded with statements that she could not be guaranteed the same job after returning, that the school lacked enough time to find a replacement, and that taking leave could affect her tenure. She eventually received approval for leave, underwent surgery, and took at least five months to recover. She also alleged that the principal made her pack up her desk and told her not to communicate with students or parents except to say that she would be taking medical leave.

Wasserman further alleged that the leave was unpaid and that the Department of Education did not tell her what steps were needed to ensure payment. The Department moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally valid claim.

Court’s Analysis

The court treated the complaint’s well-supported factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion and considered whether they plausibly supported each claim.

Family and Medical Leave Act interference

The court allowed Wasserman’s interference claim to proceed only as to her 2023 leave. A Family and Medical Leave Act interference claim requires allegations that the employee was eligible, the defendant was an employer covered by the law, the employee was entitled to leave, the employee gave notice of the intent to take leave, and the employer denied or interfered with protected benefits.

For the April 2022 leave, the court found that the amended complaint did not allege that Wasserman requested leave or gave school officials enough information about her injury for them to determine whether the Family and Medical Leave Act applied. The court therefore held that her interference claim failed to the extent it sought damages or compensation related to that leave, and that portion of the claim was dismissed.

The court reached a different conclusion concerning the 2023 leave. Wasserman allegedly told school officials about her reinjury and need for surgery, and officials allegedly made statements that could reasonably be viewed as threats to her continued employment or efforts to discourage her from taking leave. Relying on a Second Circuit decision, the court explained that an employer may interfere with Family and Medical Leave Act rights by discouraging or restraining an employee from using those rights, even if the employee ultimately takes the leave. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss this theory of interference.

The court rejected other possible interference theories. The complaint did not identify any paid leave benefits to which Wasserman was entitled or explain what administrative steps the Department of Education failed to take. It also did not allege that she was denied reinstatement, demoted, or denied an equivalent teaching position. The court declined to rule at that time on an argument concerning the amount of leave for which Wasserman might seek compensation, stating that the issue could be raised again.

Family and Medical Leave Act retaliation

The court dismissed Wasserman’s retaliation claim. Such a claim requires an adverse employment action—an action that could materially discourage a reasonable worker from exercising legal rights—after protected activity. The court held that the statements made before Wasserman’s leave could support an interference theory but could not, as alleged, constitute a later adverse action for retaliation.

The court also found that requiring Wasserman to pack up her desk and limit communications with students and parents amounted, at most, to minor slights or poor manners. The alleged failure to ensure that her leave was paid also did not support retaliation because the complaint did not plausibly allege an entitlement to paid leave, and the Family and Medical Leave Act itself generally requires unpaid rather than paid leave. The retaliation claim was dismissed.

New York City Human Rights Law discrimination

The court dismissed the discrimination claim under the New York City Human Rights Law. Although that law uses a broader standard than federal discrimination law, Wasserman still had to allege facts showing that she was treated less well because of her knee injury or another protected characteristic. The court found that the complaint offered conclusions that the Department of Education treated her less well because of a disability but did not allege facts showing unequal treatment or discriminatory intent.

The court also found that the principal’s alleged comments, while possibly rude or insensitive, did not plausibly show that the comments were motivated by bias against Wasserman’s injury. The court reasoned that the allegations were at least equally consistent with a reaction to a lengthy mid-year leave request for any reason.

New York City Human Rights Law retaliation

The court dismissed the New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim. A traditional retaliation claim under that law requires protected activity opposing discrimination and conduct that would reasonably deter a person from engaging in that activity. The court found that Wasserman had not adequately alleged discrimination in the first place and had not alleged that she opposed discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Wasserman also argued that requesting medical leave was a request for a reasonable accommodation and therefore protected activity. The court rejected that theory, holding that her request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act and her related allegations did not constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation under the New York City Human Rights Law. The court therefore held that she had not alleged protected activity under that theory.

Disposition

Judge Margaret M. Garnett granted in part and denied in part the Department of Education’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The sole remaining claim is Wasserman’s Family and Medical Leave Act interference claim concerning leave allegedly taken in early 2023. The court directed the parties to appear for an initial pretrial conference.