Lopez v. Lee

Background

Andrew Lopez, an inmate housed at San Quentin State Prison, brought a civil-rights lawsuit without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning events at Pelican Bay State Prison. The court had previously found that the complaint stated First Amendment retaliation claims against several correctional officials, including defendant Cross, and had dismissed the remaining claims and defendants.

Deputy Attorney General Ruhparwar and the California Attorney General’s Office represented Cross. They asked to withdraw because Cross had stopped responding to calls, voicemails, emails, and letters and could not be contacted. The court ordered supplemental information about the efforts to locate and contact Cross, the basis for accepting service for him, and the notice given to him about the proposed withdrawal. The supplemental materials stated that counsel had located another address for Cross and had warned him that withdrawal could adversely affect his rights and require him to obtain new counsel at his own expense.

Default-Judgment Requests

Lopez sought entry of default judgment against Cross for $3,000, plus interest and costs. The defendants opposed the request, arguing that Cross had not failed to plead or defend because counsel had timely filed a waiver of reply and demand for a jury trial and had waived service of summons. Lopez also argued that the opposition should be struck because Ruhparwar had not personally communicated with Cross.

Court’s Rulings

The court granted Ruhparwar’s request to withdraw as counsel for Cross, on behalf of herself and the California Attorney General’s Office. The court found good cause because Cross had completely refused to communicate with counsel and found that Ruhparwar had provided the required notice and taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable harm to Cross’s rights.

The court denied Lopez’s requests for entry of default and default judgment against Cross. It explained that entry of default by the clerk must come before a court can enter default judgment, and the clerk had not entered default against Cross.

The court denied as moot Lopez’s request that the court serve Cross with notices of entry of default and default judgment. The court also denied Lopez’s request to strike the opposition. It found that the filing was not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous and that Ruhparwar properly opposed the default-judgment request while she was still counsel for Cross.

The order terminated Docket Nos. 23, 26, 29, 37, and 41.