Kopmar v. The Association of Legal Aid Attorneys

Background

Plaintiffs, who the opinion describes as public interest lawyers employed by the Legal Aid Society of Nassau County and rank-and-file members of the Association of Legal Aid Attorneys (ALAA), sued the ALAA, members of its Amalgamated Council, and four rank-and-file members who filed disciplinary charges against them. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants retaliated after plaintiffs filed an earlier state-court lawsuit seeking to stop an ALAA resolution concerning Israel and Palestine that plaintiffs viewed as antisemitic. They alleged that the retaliation included harassment, union disciplinary charges, and restrictions on their participation in union activities.

The complaint asserted retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. It also asserted claims under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), a federal law protecting union members’ rights to sue and express themselves.

Anti-discrimination claims

The court held that the state-court lawsuit did not qualify as protected activity under the anti-discrimination statutes. Those statutes protect people from retaliation for opposing conduct that the statutes prohibit, including unlawful employment discrimination. The court found that the earlier lawsuit did not allege that plaintiffs or other union members received different treatment because of race, ethnicity, religion, or another protected characteristic. Instead, the lawsuit primarily argued that the resolution would create professional conflicts, harm plaintiffs’ work and reputations, and affect their relationships with clients and employers.

The court also concluded that the resolution was political speech about a matter of public concern. Although the resolution used intense language and addressed a charged subject, the court found that it criticized government policies and did not target an individual or group based on race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality. The court therefore concluded that plaintiffs could not use retaliation provisions in the anti-discrimination laws to challenge defendants’ response to the lawsuit. The court reached the same conclusion regarding later messages on the union’s internal email list, reasoning that those messages either occurred after the lawsuit or were also political expression rather than unlawful discrimination.

The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ anti-discrimination claims against all parties. Because plaintiffs did not state an entity-level retaliation claim under the New York State Human Rights Law, the court also concluded that the related aiding-and-abetting claims against individual defendants could not proceed.

LMRDA claims

The court held that plaintiffs plausibly stated LMRDA claims against the ALAA. The LMRDA protects union members’ right to sue and their freedom of expression, and prohibits a union from disciplining or otherwise impairing a member for exercising those rights. The court found that the filing and continued advancement of disciplinary charges could support an LMRDA claim even though the UAW Public Review Board ultimately dismissed the charges. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the allegations plausibly connected the charges to plaintiffs’ lawsuit and the speech contained in it.

The court also allowed the LMRDA claims against members of the Amalgamated Council to proceed. Plaintiffs alleged that those defendants approved the charges and allowed them to proceed toward a union trial. The court held that these allegations could support liability for union officials who instigate, direct, or aid an improper use of union power. Whether those defendants acted in good faith depended on disputed facts and could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

The court reached a different conclusion for Danielle Welch, Gerald Koch, Eva Stevenson, and Candace Graff, the four members who filed the disciplinary charges. The court held that they were not union officials or agents acting under union authority. The complaint also did not allege that they prosecuted the charges or took additional action beyond filing them. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the LMRDA claims against those four defendants.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. It granted the motion as to all anti-discrimination claims and as to the LMRDA claims against Welch, Koch, Stevenson, and Graff. It otherwise denied the motion. The remaining defendants were ordered to file an answer within 14 days, and the Clerk was directed to terminate the four charging defendants as parties.