C.C. v. Google, Inc.

Background

C.C. sued his former employer, Google, LLC, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. He alleged claims for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation for requesting accommodations, and retaliation for taking Family and Medical Leave Act leave.

C.C. alleged that he had post-traumatic stress disorder and severe anxiety resulting from a 2014 attack, and that chemotherapy for Stage 3 Hodgkin’s lymphoma aggravated those conditions. He alleged that his symptoms affected his sleep, concentration, work, and social interactions. After taking medical leave from December 4, 2023, through March 1, 2024, C.C. requested permission to work remotely except when in-person attendance was required, a one-hour lunch break, and 15-to-30-minute breaks between meetings. He alleged that medical providers recommended remote work and periodic breaks because commuting into New York City triggered his symptoms.

Google allegedly denied the accommodation requests, placed C.C. on unpaid leave, and entered him into a reassignment process. C.C. alleged that he identified more than 25 potential internal positions but that Google rejected each one. Google terminated his employment on June 27, 2024.

Legal standard

Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the amended complaint did not state legally sufficient claims. At this stage, the court treated well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in C.C.’s favor, but it did not accept legal conclusions stated as facts.

Disability-discrimination claims

The court dismissed C.C.’s disability-discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. For the federal claim, the court held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that C.C.’s disability was a cause of his termination. It found no direct evidence of discriminatory statements or conduct, no adequately pleaded similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably, no sufficient inference from the timing of events, and no alleged departure from regular termination procedures. The court also found that Google’s efforts to identify alternative positions undercut an inference that it intended to terminate C.C. because of his disability.

The court reached the same result under the state and city laws. Although the New York City law uses a more lenient standard under which disability-based motivation need only be one motivating factor, the court found that the complaint did not allege facts supporting that inference.

Failure-to-accommodate claims

The court denied Google’s motion to dismiss the failure-to-accommodate claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court held that C.C. plausibly alleged that he had a covered disability because his PTSD and anxiety allegedly substantially limited activities including sleeping, concentrating, and working. It also held that the complaint plausibly alleged that C.C. could perform the essential functions of his job with reasonable accommodations.

The court found the proposed accommodations plausibly reasonable at the pleading stage. The complaint alleged that remote work would reduce the need to travel into New York City, that C.C. could attend required in-person meetings and business travel, and that Google already allowed some remote work and encouraged virtual meetings. The complaint also alleged that the requested lunch and between-meeting breaks would be used for work-related tasks and would help C.C. manage his symptoms without reducing his working hours. The court emphasized that whether an accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific issue generally not resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Retaliation claims

The court dismissed C.C.’s retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. It held that the complaint did not plausibly allege a causal connection between C.C.’s accommodation request and his termination. The complaint did not allege direct retaliatory statements, different treatment of comparable employees, a pattern of retaliation, or a departure from established procedures. The approximately three-and-a-half-month gap between the accommodation request and termination was also too long, without additional supporting facts, to support an inference of retaliation. The court found that the claims failed even under the more lenient New York City standard.

Family and Medical Leave Act retaliation

The court dismissed the claim that Google retaliated against C.C. for taking Family and Medical Leave Act leave. C.C. took that leave from December 4, 2023, through March 1, 2024, and was terminated on June 27, 2024. The court held that the four-to-seven-month gap, depending on which date was used, was too long to support retaliation based on timing alone. The complaint also did not allege different treatment of comparable employees, a pattern of adverse actions against employees who took such leave, or statements connecting the termination to C.C.’s leave.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that Google’s motion to dismiss was granted as to all claims except C.C.’s failure-to-accommodate claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court therefore denied the motion as to those failure-to-accommodate claims and granted the motion to dismiss the remaining claims. An order scheduling an initial conference was to issue separately.