Peralto v. Aviles-Ramos

Background

Julio Peralto, individually and on behalf of C.P., sued the New York City Department of Education and Chancellor Melissa Aviles-Ramos under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. He sought a preliminary injunction—an order requiring immediate action while the case continues—to require the defendants to fund school-related expenses for his child. The expenses included tuition at the International Academy for the Brain, transportation provided by Sister’s Travel and Transportation Services, LLC, and nursing costs for the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 school years.

The Department of Education did not dispute that it had payment obligations for tuition and nursing services under an October 29, 2024 pendency order. It argued that it had processed payments through March 31, 2025 and was willing to work with Peralto regarding transportation. Peralto disputed that the payments were current, arguing that his agreements for tuition and nursing required full payment for the 2024–2025 school year by January 2, 2025.

Jurisdiction After the Notice of Appeal

Peralto filed a notice of interlocutory appeal from the court’s June 26, 2025 order, asserting that the order effectively denied his preliminary-injunction motion. The court concluded that the appeal did not deprive it of jurisdiction because the June 26 order was not final and had not been certified for interlocutory appeal. The June 5 order had denied Peralto’s request for an immediate conference and granted the defendants additional time to respond to the complaint, while the June 26 order expressly stated that the preliminary-injunction application had not yet been resolved. The court therefore treated the notice of appeal as defective and proceeded to decide the motion.

Preliminary-Injunction Analysis

The court applied the traditional preliminary-injunction standard, under which a plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without immediate relief, that the balance of equities favors an injunction, and that an injunction serves the public interest.

Peralto also argued that Section 1415(j) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act provided an automatic preliminary injunction requiring immediate payment. The court rejected that argument because the provision does not create a right to immediate payment unless the child’s educational placement is at risk.

The court found no evidence that C.P.’s placement or services were in danger. Peralto did not argue that the child might lose the placement or services. The Department of Education had made tuition and nursing payments through March 31, 2025, and the record contained no evidence that Sister’s Travel had stopped providing transportation or could no longer provide it. The school year covered by the pendency order had also ended.

The court separately held that Peralto failed to show irreparable harm under the traditional standard. Without a demonstrated risk to the child’s placement, the court concluded that money damages could provide an adequate remedy for the funding dispute. The court expressly stated that it did not need to decide the parties’ disagreement about whether the payments were due by January 2, 2025.

Disposition

The court denied Peralto’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion listed at docket entry 7.