Turner v. Apple, Inc.

Background

Alasdair Turner alleged that certain versions of Apple’s iOS 13 contained malfunctioning code that used cellular data for apps even when users had turned cellular-data access off for those apps. He asserted claims for trespass to chattels, violations of the California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, and the unlawful and unfair prongs of California’s Unfair Competition Law.

Turner sought certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for a damages class and under Rule 23(b)(2) for an injunction-seeking class. His proposed class covered purchasers, owners, users, or lessees of Apple iPhones in the United States who used limited cellular data plans while any version of iOS 13 was installed. The court limited its review to iOS 13.0–13.5 because that was the narrower range in the operative complaint; the proposed motion covered all versions of iOS 13.

Rule 23(a) requirements

The court found that Turner satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. The court inferred that at least 40 people—its stated threshold for numerosity—used iOS 13.0–13.5 with limited data plans. It found common questions about Apple’s knowledge of and response to the alleged malfunctioning code.

The court also found Turner’s claims typical because the data-settings issue applied to all class members rather than being unique to him. It found him adequate because he understood the basic nature of the case, had no identified conflict with the class, and could vigorously pursue the claims. The court attributed some of Turner’s lack of technical knowledge to confidentiality restrictions on information produced by Apple.

Rule 23(b)(3): damages class

The court found that a class action was the superior method for resolving the claims because the cost of individual lawsuits would outweigh the damages an individual could likely recover. But it held that Turner failed to establish predominance, meaning that individual issues did not outweigh common issues.

The court reasoned that most of Turner’s claims required proof that Apple used data without permission. Determining permission would require examining each user’s historical cellular-data settings, which Apple had not systematically recorded according to the opinion. The court also said it would be necessary to examine the code interacting with each relevant app to determine whether a bug caused data use contrary to the user’s settings. Those individualized inquiries were not suitable for class treatment.

The court further held that Turner’s proposed damages model could not reliably calculate damages because he lacked key data from an Apple dashboard and the court had denied his request to obtain that data in discovery. The court did not separately address nominal and punitive damages because the permission-related problems independently prevented certification of a damages class.

Turner argued that the alleged misclassification of data use as “System Services” prevented users from making informed decisions about controlling their data. The court said this theory did not eliminate the permission requirements for the claims and had not been pleaded in the operative complaint.

Rule 23(b)(2): injunction-seeking class

The court held that Turner lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. Standing is the legal requirement that a plaintiff show a sufficient personal stake in the requested relief, including a significant likelihood of future injury for an injunction. Turner no longer used any version of iOS at issue, and no iOS 13 versions were still available. Therefore, the court concluded that an injunction addressing the alleged iOS 13 bugs would not affect him.

Other motions and disposition

The court denied class certification. It denied as moot Apple’s motion to exclude Dr. Paroma Sanyal’s opinions, Turner’s motion to exclude Dr. Jeffrey Prince’s testimony, and Apple’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply. The court said those motions did not affect its reasons for denying class certification.

The court stated that the problems preventing class certification were fundamental and could not be cured, and that it would not consider future class-certification motions. It ordered the parties to meet and confer and submit a proposed schedule for resolving Turner’s remaining individual claims within 21 days of the order.