Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC
- Edgardo Ramos
- 1:22-cv-03320
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 7
In Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC, Judge Ramos denied plaintiffs’ motion to compel Bank of America’s deposition testimony because it was minimally relevant and burdensome.
The ruling directly affected the plaintiffs seeking deposition testimony and nonparty Bank of America, which opposed producing a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. The underlying claims against Standard Chartered were not decided by this discovery ruling.
What happened
In Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC, plaintiffs suing Standard Chartered under the Anti-Terrorism Act sought deposition testimony from nonparty Bank of America. They argued the testimony could show what government officials told the banks about fertilizer allegedly used in attacks and how Bank of America’s response compared with Standard Chartered Bank’s response.
Bank of America had already produced materials, including a presentation from the government meeting and documents about its decision to stop doing business with the fertilizer company. Plaintiffs narrowed their requested deposition, but Bank of America objected that the topics were not relevant and would impose a burden.
Judge Ramos denied the motion. He ruled that the banks’ relationships with the fertilizer company were substantially different, that industry practices alone would not show the knowledge required for the plaintiffs’ claims, and that a deposition would likely repeat information already produced while requiring Bank of America to prepare a witness.
The detailed version
- Bonacasa v. Standard Chartered PLC · No. 1:22-cv-03320
- Edgardo Ramos
- July 16, 2025
Background
The opinion lists three related actions brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. The plaintiffs allege that Standard Chartered PLC, through Standard Chartered Bank, aided al-Qaeda by providing banking services to the Fatima Group, a Pakistani fertilizer company that allegedly supplied materials used to make explosive devices. The plaintiffs are family members of service members killed by those devices in Afghanistan between 2013 and 2015.
The motion addressed discovery from nonparty Bank of America. In December 2012, the Department of Defense’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization met with Bank of America and Standard Chartered Bank and presented information about Fatima’s fertilizer. Bank of America then placed Fatima on a “do not do business” list and sent it a cease-and-desist letter. The plaintiffs sought a deposition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), which permits an organization to designate a witness to testify about specified topics.
After a court conference, Bank of America produced the presentation from the government meeting and other materials concerning Fatima and Bank of America’s decision-making. The plaintiffs later agreed to limit the deposition to three and a half hours and narrowed the topics. The remaining topics concerned the meeting, Bank of America’s services to Fatima, its understanding of Fatima’s role, and its decision to stop doing business with Fatima.
Legal standard
A subpoena to a nonparty must seek information relevant to a claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. Relevance is interpreted broadly, but a court must quash or modify a subpoena that imposes an undue burden. The party seeking discovery has the initial burden of showing relevance and proportionality.
The plaintiffs’ underlying claims require them to show that Standard Chartered Bank knowingly provided substantial assistance to an entity that committed an act of intentional terrorism. The Supreme Court has described the required participation as conscious, voluntary, and culpable.
Court’s analysis
The court identified three reasons the proposed testimony was not sufficiently relevant. First, Bank of America’s relationship with Fatima differed substantially from Standard Chartered Bank’s relationship. Bank of America said it had not done business with Fatima and had only acted as a market-maker for Fatima’s American Depository Receipts. By contrast, Standard Chartered Bank provided daily banking services, project financing, investments, loans, and U.S. dollar clearing services. The court concluded that Bank of America’s conduct would not provide a useful industry comparison for evaluating Standard Chartered Bank’s conduct.
Second, the court held that failing to follow industry standards, without more, would not establish the knowledge required for the plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, even if Bank of America’s testimony could identify an industry standard, Standard Chartered Bank’s failure to meet that standard would not meaningfully address whether it knowingly provided substantial assistance to Fatima.
Third, Bank of America represented that it could not identify a current employee who attended the December 2012 meeting. The court concluded that a Rule 30(b)(6) witness would likely have no information beyond the materials Bank of America had already produced, making the testimony potentially redundant.
The court also found that the deposition would impose an undue burden. Because Bank of America could not identify an attendee as a current employee, it would need to spend substantial time and resources preparing another witness on the requested topics. The court concluded that this burden outweighed the limited value of the proposed testimony.
Disposition
Judge Edgardo Ramos denied the plaintiffs’ motion to compel Bank of America to provide Rule 30(b)(6) deposition testimony.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.