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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled July 17, 2025

Johnson v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Judge
William Orrick
Docket
3:17-cv-00517
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
11

Counsel22 of record
PLAINTIFF
Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLCPLLC7 attorneys
Adam A. Edwards, Justin G. Day, Mitchell M. Breit
Simmons Hanly Conroy2 attorneys
Crystal Gayle Foley, An V. Truong
One Court Street
Eric S. Johnson
Finklestein & Krinsk LLPLLP
Jeffrey R. Krinsk
Greg Coleman Law PCPC
Lisa A. White
Pearson Warshaw LLPLLP
Rachel Lynn Soffin
Simmons Hanly Conry LLCLLC
Paul J. Hanly , Jr.
COUNTER CLAIMANT
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.LLP5 attorneys
Andrew L. Chang, H. Grant Law, Mark Douglas Campbell
Shook, Hardy and Bacon LLPLLP2 attorneys
Holly Pauling Smith, William Roth Sampson , Mr
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L. L. P.
Amir M. Nassihi

Counsel of record per CourtListener. Firm names are approximate and have been consolidated across spelling variants.

Civil ProcedureClass Action
In one sentence

In Johnson v. Nissan North America, Judge Orrick granted plaintiffs’ request to replace two class representatives and file a Sixth Amended Complaint.

Who this affects

The plaintiffs, the California and New York subclass representatives, Nissan North America, Inc., and members of the certified California and New York classes and subclasses.

What happened

In Johnson v. Nissan North America, plaintiffs asked to replace the representatives for the California and New York subclasses after narrowing the class definitions.

The revised definitions required the relevant vehicles to have been first sold in the applicable state. The existing representatives’ vehicles were first sold in Nevada and Tennessee, so plaintiffs proposed Anna Wall and Sandria Smith instead. Nissan argued that the change was too late, prejudiced Nissan, and could not fix problems involving standing, time limits, jurisdiction, or notice.

Judge Orrick rejected Nissan’s objections and granted the motion. He ruled that the existing representatives had standing when the classes were certified, that plaintiffs acted diligently, and that the substitution would not unfairly prejudice Nissan. Wall replaced the California representatives, Smith replaced the New York representatives, and plaintiffs were ordered to file the Sixth Amended Complaint within seven days.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Johnson v. Nissan North America, Inc. · No. 3:17-cv-00517
Judge
William Orrick
Date
July 17, 2025

Background

Plaintiffs moved to substitute Anna Wall as the class representative for the California class and subclasses and Sandria Smith as the class representative for the New York class and subclasses. They also sought leave to file a Sixth Amended Complaint. The motion followed plaintiffs’ April 1, 2025, narrowing of the class definitions. The revised California and New York definitions required that the subject vehicle have been first sold in the relevant state, among other requirements.

The existing California representative, Sherida Johnson, owned a class vehicle first sold in Nevada. The existing New York representative, Subrina Seenarain, owned a class vehicle first sold in Tennessee. Plaintiffs argued that Johnson and Seenarain remained eligible to pursue individual relief but no longer fit the revised definitions as class representatives. Smith, the proposed New York representative, purchased a used class vehicle.

The court had previously certified classes in California, New York, Colorado, and Florida. After an appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that order. At a later case-management conference, the court required updated class definitions and information about the remaining claims and damages. Discovery was scheduled to close on February 13, 2026, with trial scheduled to begin on June 8, 2026.

Nissan’s objections

Nissan argued that plaintiffs were using substitution to address a long-standing dispute about whether damages could be proven for class members who purchased used vehicles. Nissan asked the court to decertify and dismiss the California and New York subclasses, asserting that Johnson and Seenarain lacked standing when the classes were certified because their vehicles were first sold outside the relevant states.

The court rejected that argument. It held that Johnson and Seenarain had standing when certification occurred because the earlier class definitions did not require vehicles to have been first sold in the class state. The revised definitions changed the requirements, meaning the representatives no longer had standing to represent the newly defined subclasses, even though they had standing to bring their individual claims.

Nissan also argued that substitution would violate statutory time limits, create a personal-jurisdiction problem, and be futile because Wall had not initially filed a venue affidavit and a notice under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The court rejected each argument. It noted that the New York subclass had already been certified, that it had previously rejected similar jurisdiction arguments, that a venue declaration had been submitted, and that plaintiffs had sent a supplemental notice letter. The court did not resolve the parties’ broader dispute about damages for used vehicles; it stated that Nissan could raise that issue in a future motion directed at plaintiffs’ expert reports.

Rules and analysis

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), a party seeking to modify a scheduling order must show good cause, which principally concerns the party’s diligence. The court found good cause because plaintiffs acted within about a month after Nissan clarified its concerns in the March 2025 case-management filings. Plaintiffs narrowed the class definitions, searched for substitute representatives, and indicated their intention to file the motion in the April discovery plan.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, leave to amend may be denied for reasons including bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, futility, or repeated amendment. The court found no bad faith or undue delay. It also found that the proposed amendment was limited: plaintiffs sought to add two class representatives rather than add new liability theories or substantive facts. Because discovery remained open for several months, the court found Nissan’s claimed burden and prejudice unpersuasive.

Disposition

The motion was GRANTED. Anna Wall was substituted as class representative for the California class and subclasses, and Sandria Smith was substituted as class representative for the New York class and subclasses. The class-certification order was amended to conform to the ruling, and plaintiffs were ordered to file the Sixth Amended Complaint within seven days. The opinion did not state that the motion was granted with or without prejudice.

The authoritative version

Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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