Guillory v. Contra Costa County

Background

Andrew Samuel Guillory, representing himself, sued his parole officer, Carlos DeJesus; the Division of Adult Parole Operations (DAPO), which the opinion describes as part of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; and the HOPE Program. Guillory challenged a parole condition requiring him to participate in the HOPE Program’s sex-offender treatment program twice a week. He alleged that the condition violated the Eighth Amendment, due process, and equal protection, and that disclosure of records concerning a claimed juvenile adjudication violated California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 827 and 828.

Guillory also alleged that the program required him to view photographs of children and discuss his past in front of people he described as convicted child molesters. In opposition to the dismissal motion, he added allegations that Contra Costa County parole officials and DeJesus defamed him, slandered him, and falsified his Static-99R risk-assessment report. The court found those allegations unclear and unsupported by specific facts, including who allegedly falsified the report and when.

Guillory previously sought a preliminary injunction to stop enforcement of the parole condition. The court denied that request, finding that he had not shown a likelihood of success and that the Contra Costa defendants were likely immune from his claims.

HOPE Program

The HOPE Program was served but did not appear or respond. The clerk entered default, and Guillory moved for default judgment. The court did not decide that motion in this order. Instead, it ordered the HOPE Program to respond by August 11, 2025, and scheduled a hearing for August 20, 2025. The court stated that it would decide the default-judgment request after the hearing.

Dismissal of the Contra Costa Defendants

The court granted the Contra Costa defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient and plausible claim. The court addressed the claims despite concerns about the complaint’s clarity because Guillory had identified the defendants and the general constitutional and state-law theories he was asserting.

The court held that DeJesus had absolute immunity for claims based on imposing Guillory’s parole conditions. Absolute immunity protects certain officials from civil lawsuits for specified official actions. The court relied on precedent holding that parole officers have this protection when imposing parole conditions, even when the conditions are alleged to be unconstitutional.

The court separately held that DAPO was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. That doctrine generally bars federal lawsuits against a state and its agencies unless the state consents or Congress removes the protection. The court treated DAPO as a state agency and concluded that claims against the local parole office, to the extent asserted in an official capacity, functionally were claims against the State of California. The claims against DAPO were dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile.

Plausibility of Guillory’s Claims

The court also concluded that Guillory had not plausibly alleged that the parole condition was unconstitutional, that using his juvenile-adjudication records in the treatment program violated federal or state law, or that defendants falsified records.

The court noted that California law requires sex-offender treatment for people subject to the relevant registration requirements and gives parole authorities broad power to impose parole conditions. Guillory did not dispute that he failed to register as required. Based on the materials subject to judicial notice, the court found that requiring him to attend sex-offender treatment because of his failure to register appeared lawful and that Guillory cited no authority showing otherwise.

The court also found that California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 827 and 828 concern inspection of juvenile case files and do not appear to prohibit providing relevant legal documents to a facilitator of a parole treatment program. It therefore concluded that Guillory had not stated a cognizable claim based on those statutes or his related due-process and equal-protection allegations.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

Although the court granted the dismissal motion, it allowed Guillory to amend his complaint within 30 days to clarify allegations concerning possible falsification of the Static-99R report. Any amended allegations must explain what information was false, how it was false, who was responsible, when the falsification occurred, and how it affected the challenged parole condition. The order did not state that the claims against the other defendants were dismissed with prejudice.

Judge William H. Orrick therefore granted the Contra Costa defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissed the claims against DAPO with prejudice, allowed limited amendment concerning alleged record falsification, and deferred ruling on the default-judgment request against the HOPE Program.