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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled July 17, 2025

Mondano v. Banks

Judge
Ho
Docket
1:24-cv-08241
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
4
Civil ProcedurePreliminary Injunction
In one sentence

In Mondano v. Banks, Judge Ho denied the request for immediate education funding because no imminent harm to the student’s placement was shown.

Who this affects

Joseph Mondano and L.M. were affected by the denial of immediate funding relief; the DOE and its chancellor were affected by the denial of the requested order and the substitution of Melissa Aviles-Ramos for David C. Banks as a defendant.

What happened

In Mondano v. Banks, Joseph Mondano asked the court to require the New York City Department of Education and its chancellor to immediately fund L.M.’s tuition and special transportation at iBRAIN for the 2024–2025 school year.

Mondano argued that a federal special-education law automatically required this funding while the dispute continued. The court noted that L.M. attended iBRAIN throughout the school year and found no evidence that delayed payment threatened L.M.’s enrollment or services.

Judge Ho denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because Mondano did not show likely, irreparable harm. The court said it therefore did not need to decide the parties’ other arguments.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Mondano v. Banks · No. 1:24-cv-08241
Judge
Ho
Date
July 17, 2025

Background

Joseph Mondano, identified as the parent and natural guardian of L.M., a student with disabilities, sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The complaint sought an order requiring the New York City Department of Education (DOE) and its then-chancellor, David C. Banks, to fund L.M.’s special transportation services to the International Institute for the Brain (iBRAIN). The later motion sought immediate funding for L.M.’s placement at iBRAIN, including tuition and special transportation, for the 2024–2025 school year.

Mondano first filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, then withdrew it. He later filed the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction addressed in this opinion. The opinion states that L.M. attended iBRAIN throughout the 2024–2025 school year, which had ended by the time of the decision.

Arguments and Applicable Standard

Mondano argued that the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision automatically entitled him to the requested funding. The court relied on a Second Circuit decision holding that the provision automatically protects an educational placement, but does not automatically require accelerated payments unless delayed or missing payments threaten the child’s placement.

Because Mondano had not shown that payment delays threatened L.M.’s placement, the court rejected that argument. It then applied the traditional preliminary-injunction factors: likelihood of success or sufficiently serious merits questions, likely irreparable harm, the balance of hardships, and the public interest. Irreparable harm means an actual and imminent injury that money cannot adequately remedy.

Court’s Analysis

The court found no evidence that L.M.’s schooling or related services were at risk during the 2024–2025 school year. Instead, Mondano offered a conclusory assertion that the DOE’s failure to make timely payments had placed L.M.’s educational placement at risk. The court considered that assertion too speculative, particularly because L.M. had attended iBRAIN throughout the school year.

The court characterized the dispute as one about educational funding rather than educational placement. It concluded that, without an imminent threat to the educational services themselves, monetary damages could provide an adequate remedy in the underlying case. Because Mondano failed to establish irreparable harm, the court held that a preliminary injunction should not issue and did not reach the parties’ additional arguments.

Disposition

The court DENIED the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. It requested that the Clerk terminate ECF No. 50. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), it also directed the Clerk to substitute Chancellor Melissa Aviles-Ramos for David C. Banks as a defendant and update the docket.

The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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